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I. INTRODUCTION
Qualified tax partnerships are arrangements that come within the
federal definition of tax partnership but are not subject to partnership tax
reporting and accounting rules.1 They may, however, be subject to other
tax provisions. Thus, classification as a qualified tax partnership may
have significant tax consequences. Nonetheless, commentary generally
fails to consider this form of tax entity even though tax partnerships have
been an enigma since their statutory creation.2 This oversight is
unfortunate because qualified tax partnerships present fascinating policy
and theoretical considerations. This Article addresses those
considerations by explaining the relationship qualified tax partnerships
have with other tax entities, describing the aggregate-plus tax regime that
governs qualified tax partnerships, demonstrating that qualified tax
partnerships lack theoretical and policy support, and finally, proposing
modifications to the current regime that would alleviate the problems
currently besetting qualified tax partnerships.
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1. As discussed below, the IRS coined the phrase qualified partnership in 1948. See infra note
40 and accompanying text. This Article refers to such arrangements as qualified tax partnerships.
2. See J. Paul Jackson et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 1183, 1209-10 n.52 (1954) (considering whether section 761 of the 1954 Code, which codified
the definition of qualified tax partnership, excludes from the definition of tax partnership only those
arrangements coming within the definition of tax partnership or excludes borderline cases from the
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules).
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II. TAX ENTITY CLASSIFICATION SPECTRUM
The various tax entities lay along a tax entity classification
spectrum,3 ordered according to the tax law governing each type of
arrangement. Arrangements disregarded by tax law are on the far left of
the spectrum.4 Tax law disregards arrangements that do not come within
one of the tax entity definitions.5 Disregarded arrangements include, for
example: tenancies in common that are not tax partnerships; 6 cost-
sharing arrangements, such as a combined effort to dig a ditch to drain
water; 7 car pools and neighborhood block parties; 8 co-authored law
review articles; 9 and the like. Disregarded arrangements are subject to
aggregate taxation, where individual members of disregarded
arrangements report their respective shares of the tax items of the
arrangement as though the arrangement did not exist.'°
Moving along the tax entity classification spectrum, the next
arrangements are qualified tax partnerships. Tax law generally
3. See infra diagram accompanying notes 19-20 for an illustration of the Tax Entity
Classification Spectrum. See generally Donald E. Rocap & Russell S. Light, The Mixed-up World of
Pseudo Passthroughs, 85 TAXEs 323 (March 2007) (observing that several entities, including some
identified in this Article, "run a rough continuum," and describing basic features of alternative tax
regimes).
4. The term "tax law" as used throughout this Article refers to U.S. federal income tax law.
For the purposes of this Article, an "arrangement" is any type of organized effort or combination of
resources with two or more members. It does not, however, include tax trusts.
5. The tax entities include qualified tax partnerships, tax partnerships, S corporations, tax
corporations, tax trusts, and estates. A non-corporate multiple-member arrangement is disregarded if
it is not a tax trust or estate and it does not come within the definition of tax partnership. Thus, an
arrangement that lacks a joint-profit motive, does not co-own property, or does not carry on a
business would be a disregarded arrangement. See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of
Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 925, 933 (2006) ("An arrangement that is not within one of these
three definitions is a tax nothing."). This Article uses "disregarded arrangement" instead of "tax
nothing" to emphasize that the tax nothings referred to herein (i.e., the disregarded arrangements)
have two or more members.
6. See McShain v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 154, 160 (1977) (holding that a co-ownership
arrangement that leases property under a net lease agreement is not a tax partnership).
7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006).
8. Such arrangements should lack the requisite joint-profit motive of a partnership. See id.
One could argue, however, that a carpool creates economies of scale that provide an economic
benefit to the participants. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 562 (1979)
(holding that two parties form a tax partnership when they "band together to produce with
economies of scale a common product to be distributed to the members of the venture in kind"),
aff'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
9. Because law reviews do not compensate authors, a venture to co-author a law review article
should also lack the requisite joint-profit motive. See supra note 8.
10. A tax item is any of the following: income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit. Thus, the co-
owners of a disregarded tenancy in common would each respectively report income from the co-
owned property in proportion to their ownership interest in the property and would deduct or
capitalize, as appropriate, any expenditures incurred with respect to the property.
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disregards qualified tax partnerships, but recognizes them for some
purposes.11 Thus, qualified tax partnerships are subject to an "aggregate-
plus" tax regime.
Continuing along the tax entity classification spectrum, the next
arrangements are tax partnerships. Tax law originally disregarded tax
partnerships. 12  Over the years, Congress began to recognize the
existence of tax partnerships and created a body of partnership tax law.
1 3
Partnership tax law attempts to disregard tax partnerships when possible
to further equity, but it recognizes tax partnerships as needed to make tax
laws administrable.1 4  Partnership taxation is an "aggregate-plus-plus"
form of taxation, subjecting tax partnerships to more entity-tax principles
than aggregate-plus taxation imposes on qualified tax partnerships.
Continuing along the tax entity classification spectrum, the next
arrangements are S corporations. Like tax partnerships, S corporations
are subject to both aggregate tax rules and entity tax rules, but in many
instances the difference between tax partnership classification and S
corporation classification is significant. 5  The difference is attributable
in large part to the evolution of both tax partnerships and S corporations.
11. See infra Part III (discussing the tax treatment of qualified tax partnerships).
12. See Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.A., 38 Stat. 114, 166 (imposing the first income tax); see
also Bradley T. Borden, Sandra Favalukes & Todd E. Molz, A History and Analysis of the Co-
Ownership-Partnership Question, 106 TAX NOTES 1175, 1175-80 (2005) (discussing the history of
partnership taxation).
13. See Borden, supra note 5, at 943-57 (discussing Congress's recognition of tax partnerships
and its imposition of, and policy reasons for, partnership tax rules).
14. See Borden, supra note 5, at 942 ("Congress attempted to treat partner taxpayers similarly
to the standard taxpayer who would conduct similar business or own property individually. To
preserve partnership disregard, Congress enacted minimally intrusive rules necessitated by tax
administration.").
15. Because the income and deductions of both tax partnerships and S corporations flow
through to their owners who include such amounts in their individual computations of taxable
income, these arrangements are often referred to as flow-through entities. In an operational sense,
these entities and their owners are subject to similar rules. In the transactional context, however, the
entities may be subject to significantly different sets of rules. For example, new members of a
corporation may be taxed on contributions to corporations if they are not members of the control
group. See I.R.C. § 351 (a) (2000) (allowing nonrecognition to taxpayers who contribute property to
a corporation in exchange for corporate stock, if immediately after the contribution the contributor is
in control of the corporation). In contrast, new members of a partnership are not taxed on
contributions to the partnership, unless deemed to receive a distribution due to change in individual
liabilities and shares of partnership liabilities. See id. § 721(a) (providing that neither the partners
nor the partnership recognize gain or loss on the contribution of property to a partnership); Id. §
752(b) (providing that a partnership is deemed to distribute cash to a partner if the partnership
assumes a liability of the partner or the partner's share of partnership liabilities decreases); see also
Jerald David August, Benefits and Burdens of Subchapter S in a Check-the-Box World, 4 FLA. TAX
REV. 287, 294-319 (1999) (comparing the different tax treatment of S corporations and tax
partnerships); James S. Eustice, Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass
Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary Proposals), 39 TAX L. REV. 345, 352-411 (1984) (comparing
S corporations to tax partnerships).
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Whereas Congress originally disregarded partnerships and developed
partnership tax law to effectively administer the taxation of partners, it
carved S corporations out of the broader group of tax corporations.' 6 The
group of tax corporations also includes C corporations.' 7 C corporations
(arrangements on the end of the tax entity classification spectrum
opposite disregarded arrangements) are subject to entity taxation.' 8
Beginning with the entity tax regime and removing some of the entity
taxation elements, Congress created S corporations.' 9  Therefore, S
corporations are subject to an "entity-minus" tax regime.
The following diagram depicts the tax entity classification of
multiple-member arrangements. Notice that moving from the left, the
tax regime begins with aggregate taxation and moves by degree toward
entity taxation.
Tax Entity Classification Spectrum
(Multiple-Member Arrangements)
Disregarded Qualified Tax Tax S C
Arrangements Partnerships Partnerships Corporations Corporations
Aggregate Aggregate-Plus Aggregate-Plus- Entity-Minus Entity
Taxation Taxation Plus Taxation Taxation Taxation
The definitions of the various arrangements determine the tax regime
that will apply to a particular arrangement, and, in a waterfall fashion,
the definitions place arrangements within the various classifications.
First, any arrangement that comes within the definition of tax corporation
falls within the tax corporation grouping.z Second, any arrangement
16. This article uses the term "tax corporation" to refer to all entities classified as corporations
under tax law. All state law corporations and other specifically identified state or federal entities are
tax corporations. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2007). Other business entities may
elect tax corporation classification. Id. § 301.7701-3(a).
17. The designation "C corporation" derives from subchapter C of the Code, the subchapter
governing all tax corporations other than S corporations.
18. See I.R.C. § 1 (a) (2000) (imposing an income tax on corporations).
19. See Id. § 1371(a) (providing that subchapter C applies to S corporations to the extent not
provided for in subchapter S); see August, supra note 15 at 322-30 (discussing the history of
subchapter S).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2007).
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that is not a tax corporation and comes within the definition of tax
partnership falls within the tax partnership grouping.21  All other
arrangements fall within the disregarded arrangement grouping.22
A parallel structure subdivides arrangements within the tax
corporation grouping and the tax partnership grouping. The group of tax
corporations consists of both C corporations and S corporations. Tax
corporations that make valid S elections are S corporations. 3 All other
tax corporations are C corporations. The group of tax partnerships
consists of both tax partnerships and qualified tax partnerships. Tax
partnerships that make valid section 761 elections are qualified tax
partnerships.24 All other tax partnerships are simply tax partnerships.
The following Venn diagram illustrates the parallel structure of tax
partnerships and tax corporations.
Tax Groupings of Multiple-Member
Arrangements
" -" Multiple-Member
Arrangements
Tax a
Partnerships Corrations
lPartnerships
21. See Borden, supra note 5, at 937 ("An arrangement that is not a tax trust or tax corporation
is a tax partnership, if within the definition of tax partnership.").
22. See supra note 5.
23. See I.R.C. § 1362(a)(1) (2000). A valid S election for this purpose is an S election made in
accordance with the requirements in section 1362 and related regulations by an entity that is a small
business corporation as defined in section 1361(b). A business entity that is not a tax corporation
that makes a valid S election will be deemed also to have made a valid check-the-box election. See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1)(v)(C) (as amended in 2007).
24. See I.R.C. § 761(a) (2000) (providing that certain tax partnerships may elect out of
subchapter K); infra text accompanying note 40 (discussing the origin and use of the term "qualified
tax partnership"). All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended,
unless stated otherwise.
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Because the definitions of the various arrangements determine an
arrangement's grouping and applicable tax regime, the definitions are
important. The definitions of tax corporation and S corporation are
relatively clear.25  Indeed, commentators have devoted significant
attention to tax corporations, entity taxation, and the related policy
issues.26 Similarly, commentators have discussed S corporations, 2 and
legislative history describes that the purpose of S corporations is to allow
small business owners to take advantage of the liability protection of a
corporation without double taxation.28  Even though this purpose helps
explain S corporations, it does not encompass the entire definition.29 The
requirements in the Code make the definition of S corporation more
clear.3°
In contrast to the established definitions of tax corporation and S
corporation, the definition of tax partnership is not clear.31 Because
qualified tax partnerships are a subgroup of the tax partnership group, the
definition of qualified tax partnership is afortiori unclear. Furthermore,
a relatively small amount of commentary has been devoted to the
definitions of tax partnership and qualified tax partnership, or the policy
underlying aggregate-plus taxation.32 The lack of attention devoted to
25. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2007) (listing the entities that are tax
corporations); id § 301.7701-3(a) (providing that an entity that is not classified as a tax corporation
under section 301.7701-2(b) may elect to be a tax corporation); I.R.C. § 1361 (2000) (listing the
requirements that a corporation must satisfy to be make a valid S election); I.R.C. § 1362 (2000)
(providing rules for making the S election).
26. Borden, supra note 5, at 934 n.30, 935 n.33.
27. See, e.g., Thomas C. Plowden-Wardlaw, Election of Certain Small Business Corporations
as to Taxable Status: Technical Amendments Act of 1958 Internal Revenue Code Subchapter S, 23
ALB. L. REV. 245 (1959) (discussing the technical elements of subchapter S immediately following
the 1958 amendments and presenting some pitfalls of failing to meet the requirements of subchapter
S); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It Time to Give the S Corporation a Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAX REV.
591, 637 (1996) (discussing S Corporations generally and positing that "the S corporation is a
vehicle with little continuing viability").
28. See S. REP. No. 85-1983, at 87 (1958) (stating that the provision is a "substantial benefit to
small corporations" because a "double" tax is removed).
29. See Schwidetzky, supra note 27, at 595 ("Little in the legislative history of the S
corporation reveals why these restrictions were chosen.").
30. "Code" refers to the tntemal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
31. See Borden, supra note 5, at 975 (identifying ten different tests that Congress, courts,
Treasury, and the IRS use to determine whether an arrangement is a tax partnership).
32. Professor Martin J. McMahon, Jr. wrote a significant piece about production qualified tax
partnerships, providing an in-depth analysis of arrangements that are eligible to make a section 761
election, the eligibility requirements for making such an election, and the effect of making such an
election. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Availability and Effect of Election Out of Partnership
Status Under Section 761(a), 9 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1989); see also Noah S. Baer, Selling a Partnership
Interest After an Election Out of Subchapter K, 9 J. P'SHIP TAX'N 229, 230-34 (1992) (discussing
the history and purpose of qualified tax partnerships); Bradley T. Borden, Revisiting the Federal Tax
Definition of Partnership and the § 761(a)(1) Election in the TIC Environment, 47 TAX MGM'T
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the purposes of tax partnerships and qualified tax partnerships, and the
policy underlying aggregate-plus taxation, compounds the difficulty of
clearly defining each arrangement.33 The neglect of these issues is
problematic because a significant percentage of all arrangements are
either tax partnerships or qualified tax partnerships.
34
The lack of commentary about qualified tax partnerships may stem
from a perception of their relative significance. Entity taxation imposes
double taxation on shareholders-a continuous tax concern. Business
owners and the government can predict and understand the outcome of
double taxation. Both know that business owners will generally pay
more tax under double taxation than they would in its absence. Because
of the general interest in double taxation, the definition of tax
corporation, which determines the type of arrangements that will be
subject to entity taxation, attracts attention.
On the other hand, aggregate-plus taxation does not impose double
taxation. The tax issues that arise from tax partnership classification tend
to be episodic, often arising only when one of a limited class of
transactions occurs. 35  Often, taxpayers and the IRS cannot predict the
type of transaction that will implicate tax partnership classification.
Without knowing this information, neither taxpayers nor the IRS can
predict ex ante the position either will take with respect to the
classification of a tax partnership. 36  Nonetheless, the innumerable
MEMO 51, 52-57 (Feb. 6, 2006) (focusing on the definition of tax partnership and investment
qualified tax partnership). A few articles have struggled with the definition of tax partnership. See,
e.g., Borden, supra note 5, at 1008-26 (providing an in-depth analysis of tax partnerships). See
generally Timothy M. Larason, "Tax Partnerships" Offer Greater Benefits as Entities for Oil and
Gas Operations, 60 J. TAX'N 30 (1984) (discussing the benefits of tax partnership classification).
33. See Borden, supra note 5, at 927 ("[A]lthough the federal definition of tax partnership has
been at issue in over 150 statutes, cases, regulations, and rulings, it is the rare occasion that tax
policy has governed attempts to define tax partnership."); Bradley T. Borden, A Catalogue of Legal
Authority Addressing the Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, in TAX PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC
& FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 445,445-72
(Louis S. Freeman & Clifford M. Warren eds., 2007) (listing and briefly describing the legal
authority that has addressed the definition of tax partnership).
34. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed
Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295, 297-98 & nn.13-14 (Steven A. Bank &
Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) (summarizing statistics of 2001 tax entity filings that show 2,132,000 tax
partnership filings and 5,135,591 tax corporation filings). That data most likely does not reflect the
number of qualified tax partnerships in existence because such entities likely filed a tax return to
make the section 761 election and then did not file again. Therefore, data probably does not exist to
show the actual number of qualified tax partnerships in existence.
35. See Borden, supra note 5, at 957-69 (identifying several transactions affected by tax
partnership classification: the characterization of gain or loss on the disposition of property, the
person to whom tax items should be allocated, the tax effects upon the formation of an arrangement,
the nature of property transferred, the effect liabilities have on the basis of property, and whether
certain costs must be capitalized).
36. See Borden, supra note 33.
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transactions that occur each year, and the costs incurred to contend the
issue of tax partnership classification, make the definition of tax
partnership important and worthy of greater attention.37  The tax
significance of qualified tax partnership classification is similarly largely
episodic but can be very important. Despite the significance of both
issues, they receive scant attention.
An earlier article explored the definition of tax partnership. 38 This
Article's focus is farther to the left, examining the definition of qualified
tax partnership. The Article first explains the relationship between
disregarded arrangements, qualified tax partnerships, and tax
partnerships-a relationship that is often misunderstood. This
explanation establishes the separate identity of qualified tax partnerships.
The discussion then focuses on the tax treatment of qualified tax
partnerships. Understanding that treatment sets the stage for examining
whether policy supports the concept and current definition of qualified
tax partnerships. This examination reveals that policy does not support
qualified tax partnerships. One way to remedy this problem is to amend
the definition of tax partnership, as recommended in the earlier article.
39
In the absence of such remedy, the definition of qualified tax partnership
plays an important role. That definition exempts certain tax partnerships
from the tax partnership rules. Thus, if lawmakers do not modify the
definition of tax partnership, Treasury should modify the definition of
qualified tax partnership to better reflect changes that have occurred
since its origin some thirty-five years ago and, more importantly, sound
tax policy. The Article also exposes deficiencies in the current
aggregate-plus tax regime and proposes modifications that would remove
the deficiencies and reflect sound tax policy.
37. Additionally, the distinction between aggregate-plus-plus taxation and entity-minus
taxation deserves more attention.
38. See Borden, supra note 5.
39. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1028 ("Based on the above analysis and retaining the tax-
entity default rule, a tax partnership is two or more persons, at least one of whom provides
significant services, who have (or will have) common gross income, This proposed definition
incorporates all of the tests that pass policy scrutiny and are necessary for a workable definition of
tax partnership, and it disposes of the tests that fail policy scrutiny."). That proposed definition
would not include the definition of production qualified tax partnerships because such arrangements
do not have a common gross income. Id. at 1017-23 (discussing the inadequacies of the joint-profit
test used to analyze co-owned joint-production arrangements). It would not include investment
qualified tax partnerships because no co-owner in such an arrangement provides significant services.
Id. at 1012-15, 1024-26 (discussing the strength of the degree-of-activity test, the type-of-activity
test, and the source-of-activity test used to determine whether a co-ownership arrangement is a tax
partnership). See also infra Part VIA. (discussing the definition-narrowing proposal).
[Vol. 56
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III. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF QUALIFIED TAx
PARTNERSHIP CLASSIFICATION
The IRS coined the phrase "qualified partnership" in 1948.40 It ruled
at that time that a particular oil and gas co-owned joint-production
arrangement was a tax partnership but that it did not have to follow the
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules.41  An earlier regulation
provided that co-owned joint-production arrangements are not
42
necessarily tax partnerships. Any arrangement that was not a tax
partnership under that earlier regulation would not have been subject to
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules and should have been
disregarded for all other tax purposes.43 The IRS's change of position
regarding co-owned joint-production arrangements was inspired by
Congress's enactment of a broad definition of tax partnership.44
Following the enactment of that broad definition, which included joint
ventures, the IRS was obligated to rule that co-owned joint-production
arrangements were tax partnerships.45 Nonetheless, it ruled that such
arrangements should not be subject to the partnership tax accounting and
reporting rules,4 6 thus creating qualified tax partnerships. Congress has
since recognized qualified tax partnerships, 47 and they remain a fixture of
the U.S. tax system.
40. See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, 129 ("The Bureau, under [I.T. 2749 and I.T. 2785] has
consistently treated all such operating agreements as creating qualified partnerships ... ." (emphasis
added)). Some commentators have picked up on that usage. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 32, at 230
("With I.T. 3930, the Service determined to divide those agreements into associations and 'qualified
partnerships."'); Borden, supra note 5, at 984 ("Joint profit is an element of the substantive-law test,
but it has found special application defining qualified tax partnerships. Qualified tax partnerships
are those arrangements that meet the definition of tax partnership but are not required to follow the
partnership tax accounting and reporting rules."). This Article uses "qualified tax partnership"
instead of "qualified partnership," as used originally by the IRS, because it uses the term "tax
partnership" to refer to arrangements tax law recognizes as partnerships.
41. See I.T. 3930, at 128-29. "Co-owned joint-production arrangements are those whose
members co-own property and pool resources to produce something from the co-owned property."
Borden, supra note 5, at 984.
42. See Trust No. 5833, Sec.-First Nat. Bank of L.A. v. Welch, 54 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir.
1931) ("'Co-owners of oil lands engaged in developing the property through a common agent are not
necessarily partners."') (citing Regulations 74, Art. 1317 (1931)).
43. Borden, supra note 5, at 957, 969.
44. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § llll(a)(3), 47 Stat. 169, 289 (redefining tax
partnership).
45. See IT. 2749, 8-1 C.B. 99, 99-100 (1934) (stating co-ownerships of oil and gas leases are
joint ventures); Borden, supra note 5, at 986.
46. I.T. 2785, 8-1 C.B. 96, 96-97 (1934).
47. See I.R.C. § 761(a) (2000).
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A. Definitional Groupings of Non-Corporate Arrangements
Qualified tax partnerships are one of three non-corporate
arrangements. The relationship of the three non-corporate arrangements
(the three arrangements on the left end of the tax entity classification
spectrum) 48 is analogous to that of a family of Russian nesting dolls. In
the case of non-corporate arrangements, within the broad group of non-
corporate arrangements nests the smaller group of tax partnerships, and
within the group of tax partnerships nests the even smaller group of
qualified tax partnerships. The following Venn diagram depicts the
nesting relationship of the three groups of non-corporate arrangements.
Groupings of Non-Corporate
Arrangements
This relationship helps explain the significance of the definitions of
tax partnership and qualified tax partnership. The area outside the tax
partnerships circle and within the non-corporate arrangements circle
represents disregarded arrangements.49  The line separating tax
partnerships from disregarded arrangements is the definition of tax
48. See supra diagram accompanying notes 19-20.
49. As explained above, arrangements that do not come within the definition of tax corporation
are either disregarded arrangements, tax partnerships, or qualified tax partnerships. See supra text
accompanying notes 20-24. Because the diagram identifies three types of non-corporate
arrangements, and two of the types are defined, those arrangements that are neither tax partnerships
nor qualified tax partnerships are disregarded arrangements.
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partnership.5 ° The line separating tax partnerships from qualified tax
partnerships is the definition of qualified tax partnership. The definitions
of tax partnership and qualified tax partnership therefore separate the
three types of arrangements.
From a definitional perspective, the definition of tax partnership
creates a group of arrangements that is smaller than the total group of
non-corporate arrangements. The definition of tax partnership does this
by adding criteria to the definition of non-corporate arrangements. For
example, the definition of non-corporate arrangement might be: "any
arrangement that does not come within the definition of tax
corporation. ' '51  This broad definition would include a simple co-
ownership of raw land, an unincorporated thousand-person law firm, a
co-owned joint-production arrangement, and an infinite number of other
arrangements.
The definition of tax partnership creates a narrower group of
arrangements that is a subset of non-corporate arrangements. It creates
that smaller group by adding to the definition of non-corporate
arrangement the requirement that the arrangement "conduct some
activity and divide the profits among its members." 52  This definition
excludes from the group of tax partnerships any non-corporate
arrangement that does not conduct some activity or that has no profits.
An example of such an arrangement would be a mere cost-sharing
arrangement under which the members join together to dig a ditch to
drain their adjacent properties.53  Although a mere cost-sharing
arrangement is a non-corporate arrangement that conducts activities, it
provides no profits to divide among its members. Thus, it does not come
within the definition of tax partnership.
The definition of qualified tax partnership creates a group of non-
corporate arrangements that is even narrower than the group of tax
partnerships. The definition does this by adding requirements to the
50. See supra text accompanying note 221.
51. Non-corporate, multiple-member arrangement is not defined in tax law. Such arrangements
do, however, exist, as this discussion demonstrates.
52. Because there is no exact definition of tax partnership, this is an example of what the
definition might be. The substantive law definition focuses on business activity and sharing of
profit. Sharing of profit is not a tax term or concept so it has little utility in the tax context. See
Borden, supra note 5, at 1017-23. As discussed above, the focus on business activity also has
limited utility. A potentially workable definition would focus on the number of members, whether
the members contribute services, and would consider the control of gross income instead of profit
sharing. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 5, at 1028 (proposing the following definition: "a tax
partnership is two or more persons, at least one of whom provides significant services, who have (or
will have) common gross income").
53. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006).
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definition of tax partnership. For example, the definition of qualified tax
partnership might add to the definition of tax partnership the requirement
that the members of the arrangement co-own the property and take the
arrangement's product in kind.5 4 This additional requirement creates a
group of non-corporate arrangements that is smaller than, and contained
within, the group of tax partnerships. The following Venn diagram
illustrates the definitional progression of non-corporate arrangements.
Definitional Groupings of Non-Corporate
Arrangements
(Tax Partnership and Qualified Partnership Subsets)
Although this structure appears to be simple, it is not necessarily
intuitive. Recall that qualified tax partnerships lay between disregarded
arrangements and tax partnerships on the Tax Entity Classification
Spectrum. 55  The Tax Entity Classification Spectrum groups
arrangements according to the applicable tax regime. The entity
groupings these Venn diagrams represent are based upon the definitions
of the arrangements. As stated above, the definitions of group
arrangements determine the tax regime that applies to a specific
arrangement (for example, S corporations are subject to entity-minus
taxation and the definition of S corporation determines whether an
54. See id § 1 .761-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995) (requiring the members of a joint-production
arrangement to co-own the arrangement's property, reserve the fight to take the arrangement's
product in kind, and not jointly sell the arrangement's product to come within the definition of
production qualified tax partnership).
55. See supra diagram accompanying notes 19 20.
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arrangement is an S corporation). 56 To fully appreciate the relationship
of arrangements, one must keep the different groupings separate.
Attempting to group non-corporate arrangements definitionally
according to the applicable tax regime produces an unworkable structure.
Such alternative definitional grouping would diminish the utility of the
section 761 elections, which define qualified tax partnerships and exempt
certain tax partnerships from subchapter K.57  For example, if the
definition of qualified tax partnership expanded the definition of tax
partnership, tax partnerships would become a subset of qualified tax
partnerships, or qualified tax partnerships would become a separate
subset of non-corporate arrangements outside the tax partnership subset.
Either interpretation is unworkable. The following Venn diagram
represents the first unworkable alternative interpretation of the
relationship: tax partnerships as a subset of qualified tax partnerships.
First Unworkable View of Groupings of
Non-Corporate Arrangements
Tax
Partnerships
The second unworkable interpretation of the relationship of tax
partnerships and qualified tax partnerships presents qualified tax
partnerships as a subset of non-corporate arrangements outside the tax
56. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62.
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partnership subset. The following Venn diagram presents that
unworkable interpretation.
Second Unworkable View of Groupings of
Non-Corporate Arrangements
These two interpretations are unworkable because an arrangement
could elect out of subchapter K only if subchapter K applied to such
arrangement. The gateway to subchapter K is the definition of tax
partnership. 58 The only type of arrangement that would have occasion to
elect out of subchapter K would be an arrangement that is subject to
subchapter K. Therefore, any interpretation of the relationship that does
not identify qualified tax partnerships as a subset of tax partnerships is
incorrect and unworkable. Understanding this relationship is key to
analyzing the definition of qualified tax partnership. The definition of
qualified tax partnership that Congress (through statute) and Treasury
(through regulation) have established must create a group of
arrangements that are a subset of tax partnerships.
58. See Borden, supra note 5, at 960 ("The definition of tax partnership also determines
whether subchapter K applies.").
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B. Definitional Construct of Qualified Tax Partnerships
The requirements for section 761 election constitute the definition of
qualified tax partnership. A qualified tax partnership is any tax
partnership that makes a valid election under section 761. 59  Thus, an
exploration of the definition of qualified tax partnership requires an
examination of the section 761 election requirements. Tax partnerships
may consider one of three elections: (1) the election to be an investment
qualified tax partnership; 60 (2) the election to be a production qualified
tax partnership;61 and (3) the election to be an underwriting qualified tax
partnership. 62 This Article focuses on the first two types of qualified tax
partnerships.63 In addition to satisfying the specific requirements of each
definition, the arrangement must be able to determine its income without
computing partnership taxable income.64  With that in mind, the
following discussion considers the two definitions of qualified tax
partnership.
1. Investment Qualified Tax Partnership
An investment qualified tax partnership is "an unincorporated
organization.., availed of... for investment purposes only and not for
the active conduct of a business. ' 65  Treasury regulations amplify this
definition to be an arrangement "[w]here the participants in the joint
purchase, retention, sale, or exchange of investment property: [(1)] [o]wn
the property as coowners, [(2)] [r]eserve the right separately to take or
dispose of their shares of any property acquired or retained, and [(3)]
59. See Borden, supra note 32, at 58-59 (describing actual and deemed elections); see also
McMahon, supra note 32, at 21-30 (discussing the eligibility and procedure for making an election
under section 761(a)(2)).
60. I.R.C. § 761(a)(1) (2000).
61. Id. § 761(a)(2).
62. See id. § 761(a)(3) (providing that an underwriting qualified tax partnership is "an
unincorporated organization... availed of... by dealers in securities for a short period for the
purpose of underwriting, selling, or distributing a particular issue of securities, if the income of the
members of the organization may be adequately determined without the computation of partnership
taxable income").
63. Part of the reason for narrowing the focus of this Article is that Treasury has supplemented
the statutory definition of investment qualified tax partnerships and production qualified tax
partnerships with regulatory requirements. See Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(2), (3) (as amended in
1994).
64. See l.R.C. § 761(a) (2000).
65. Id. § 761(a)(1) (2000).
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[d]o not actively conduct business. 66 Because no case law (and little
commentary) addresses qualified tax partnerships, determining the scope
of the definition requires some speculation. Perhaps the definition
applies to certain types of investment clubs, a possibility that the IRS has
considered in two rulings.67 Members of such arrangements contribute
cash, co-own investments, and only engage in investment activities.
68
Thus, such arrangements appear to satisfy the definition of investment
qualified tax partnership.
Certain rental real estate co-ownership arrangements should also
come within the definition of investment qualified tax partnership.
Owning and renting property under a triple-net lease is not a business
activity because the owners merely collect rent from the property, which
is not sufficient to be a business activity.69 Also, holding real estate for
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1995) (prohibiting further members of the
arrangement from "authoriz[ing] some person or persons acting in a representative capacity to
purchase, sell, or exchange such investment property, although each separate participant may
delegate authority to purchase, sell, or exchange his share of any such investment property for the
time being for his account, but not for a period of more than a year").
67. Two non-section 761(a)(1) rulings identify investment clubs to which section 761(a)(1)
may apply. In Revenue Ruling 75-523, a group of investors formed an investment club that was a
tax partnership. 1975-2 C.B. 257. The members of the investment club contributed only cash to the
club, co-owned the club's investments, and reserved a right to separately take or dispose of their
respective shares of the investments. Id. The club's income derived solely from taxable dividends,
interest, and gains from the sale of the securities. The investment club incurred expenses for items
such as "postage, stationery, safe deposit box rentals, bank charges, fees for accounting and
investment services, rent, and utility charges." Id. The IRS ruled that the investment club did not
carry on a trade or business within the definition of section 162, even though it "is considered to
have an objective to carry on business for purposes of section 7701." Id. See also I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Memo. 33,469 (March 28, 1967) (advising on the issues in Revenue Ruling 75-523).
In Revenue Ruling 75-525, the IRS ruled that income from an investment club was not self-
employment income under section 1402 because the partnership's activities were "limited to
investment in savings certificates and collection of interest" on those investments, which are not
sufficient to create a trade or business required under section 1402. 1975-2 C.B. 350. The
arrangements in Revenue Rulings 75-523 and 75-525 had section 212 investment activity, but no
section 162 trade or business activity. Id.; Rev. Rul. 75-523, 1975-2 C.B. 257. Section 761(a)(l)'s
language regarding investment purposes only and disallowing active trade or business indicates that
the investment clubs described in the rulings should qualify for the election.
68. Investment activities would be those activities that give rise to a deduction under section
212, but not under section 162. Id.
69. See, e.g., Grier v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D. Conn. 1954) (holding that
leasing property for a long period to a single tenant with minimal effort by the lessor is not a trade or
business), aff'd, 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955); Neill v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 197, 198 (1942) ("[T]he
mere ownership of property from which income is drawn does not constitute the carrying on of
business within the purview of [section 162].") (citing McCoach v. Minehill & Schuylkill Haven
R.R. Co., 228 U.S. 295 (1913); Stafford Owners, Inc. v. United States, 39 F.2d 743 (1930)); see also
Gorod v. Comm'r, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1569, 1572 (1981) (holding that a person who advertised rental
property and kept it in rental condition, but could not rent the property, held the property for
production of income and could deduct costs under section 212).
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speculative purposes is not a trade or business. 70  Co-ownership
arrangements of such property should be deemed investment qualified
tax partnerships if they are tax partnerships and make a valid section 761
election. 71 Co-owners who provide management services to tenants
probably conduct business activity and thus could not come within the
definition of investment qualified tax partnership. 72 Those few types of
arrangements appear to be the universe of investment qualified tax
partnerships.
2. Production Qualified Tax Partnership
A production qualified tax partnership is "an unincorporated
organization... availed of ... for the joint production, extraction, or use
of property, but not for the purpose of selling services or property
produced or extracted., 73 Treasury regulations provide that members of
co-owned joint-production arrangements may qualify for the election if
they "[(1)] [o]wn the property as coowners, [in a form granting them]
exclusive operating rights, [(2)] [r]eserve the right separately to take in
kind or dispose of their shares of any property produced, extracted, or
used, and [(3)] [d]o not jointly sell services or the property produced or
extracted ... ,74 This definition applies to co-owned joint-production
70. See Harris v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1370, 1374 (1978) (holding that trips to maintain
an investment property were deductible, but trips that were unnecessary for maintenance were not).
71. Such arrangements may not, however, be tax partnerships under the type-of-activity test.
See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (stating that "[t]he furnishing of customary services in
connection with the maintenance and repair of the apartment project will not render a coownership a
partnership").
72. See, e.g., Pinchot v. Comm'r, 113 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1940) ("What was done was more
than the investment and re-investment of funds in real estate. It was the management of the real
estate itself for profit .... It necessarily involved alterations and repairs commensurate with the
value and number of buildings cared for and such transactions as were necessary constitute a
recognized form of business. The management of real estate on such a scale for income producing
purposes required regular and continuous activity of the kind which is commonly concerned with the
employment of labor; the purchase of materials; the making of contracts; and many other things
which come within the definition of business .... ); Cecil v. Comm'r, 100 F.2d 896, 901 (4th Cir.
1939) ("The taxpayer was not investing fresh capital in a new enterprise but was endeavoring to
make presently owned property productive of new income."); Francis v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH)
704 (1977) (holding that property owner was in the trade or business of operating a rental apartment
complex); Hazard v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 372 (1946) (holding that the property owner held rental
property for use in a trade or business, even though business activity appears to have been minimal).
73. I.R.C. § 761(a)(2) (2000).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1995). A limited exception to the third
requirement allows "each separate participant [to] delegate authority to sell his share of the property
produced or extracted for the time being for his account, but not for a period of time in excess of the
minimum needs of the industry, and in no event for more than 1 year .. " § 1.761-2(a)(3)(iii).
Additional rules apply to entities that produce natural gas under a joint operating agreement. §
1.761-2(a)(3). Also, an entity that has a principal purpose of "cycling, manufacturing, or processing
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arrangements, which apparently could include oil and gas joint-
production arrangements, 75 co-mining arrangements, 76 and electrical
power co-generation arrangements, 77 among others.
Production qualified tax partnerships have an identifiable history and
purpose that shed general light on qualified tax partnerships. The
definition of production qualified tax partnership appears to be a
codification of the IRS's early joint-profit test.78  Prior to the enactment
of the statutory definition of tax partnership, Treasury understood certain
oil and gas co-owned joint-production arrangements to be beyond the
scope of the definition of a tax partnership. 79 In 1932, Congress defined
partnership as any "syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or other
unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business,
financial operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not, within the
meaning of this Act, a trust or estate or a corporation."80  Courts,
Treasury, and the IRS have interpreted this definition broadly. 8'
Following the enactment of the statutory definition of tax
partnership, Treasury withdrew its earlier interpretation of the definition
of tax partnership.8 2 Later, the IRS ruled that co-owned joint-production
arrangements come within the definition of tax partnership but are not
for persons who are not members of the organization" cannot elect out of subchapter K. Id.
75. See Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30-31 (ruling that an oil co-owned joint-operating
arrangement that made a valid section 761 election remained subject to some Code provisions
outside of subchapter K).
76. See Rev. Rul. 83-129, 1983-2 C.B. 105 (noting that an "election under section 761(a)
excluded the [co-mining] partnership from the provisions of subchapter K").
77. See Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569, 571-72 (ruling that a co-owned joint power
production arrangement was a tax partnership eligible to make the section 761(a)(2) election). See
also Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1980) (ruling that the
arrangement was a tax partnership without considering whether its section 761 election was valid).
78. See Borden, supra note 5, at 990 ("The... joint-profit test is preserved in section 761(a)(2),
which allows certain arrangements that co-own property and distribute production from the property
in kind to its members to elect out of subchapter K.").
79. See Trust No. 5833, Sec.-First Nat'l Bank of L.A. v. Welch, 54 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir.
1931) ("Co-owners of oil lands engaged in developing the property through a common agent are not
necessarily partners." (citing Regulations 74, Art. 1317 (1931))).
80. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § Ill l(a)(3), 47 Stat. 289. That definition largely survives
today in sections 7701(a)(2) and 761(a).
81. See, e.g., Bussing v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 449, 460 (1987) (stating that the federal tax
definition of partnership "is broader in scope than the meaning of the term at common law"); Kelly
v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1090, 1101 (1970) (observing that the definition of tax partnership is
broader than state-law definition); Baughn v. Comm'r, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1447, 1455 (1969) (stating
that "the statutory definition of [tax] partnership is ... broader ... than the common law meaning"
of partnership).
82. Regulations 77 did not include Art. 1317. See also I.T. 2749, XIII-1 C.B. 99, 100 (1934)
("The omission of the provisions of article 1317 of Regulations 74 from Regulations 77... was
occasioned by the definition of a partnership contained in section I111 (a)(3) of the Revenue Act of
1932... which definition did not appear in the Revenue Act of 1928.").
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required to follow the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules (in
other words, they are qualified tax partnerships)." Under the IRS's
joint-profit test, co-owned joint-production arrangements that distribute
their entire product in kind to their members were qualified tax
partnerships.84 The statutory definition of production qualified tax
partnership codifies the IRS's joint-profit test.85
C. Effect of Protective Elections
Every arrangement is either a tax partnership or not.86 The inability,
however, to precisely determine the classification of arrangements in
certain situations gives rise to protective section 761 elections. In many
situations, the arrangement's classification is clear. For example, an
incorporated arrangement is a tax corporation,87 and therefore not a tax
partnership. A two-member unincorporated law firm comes within the
definition of tax partnership,88 so it would be a tax partnership. A mere
expense-sharing arrangement is not a tax partnership; 89 it is a disregarded
arrangement. The proper classification of several non-corporate
arrangements is unclear, however, because the definition of partnership
is unclear. The only way to determine the classification of such
83. See I.T. 2785, XIII-I C.B. 96 (1934) (discussing the "coownership of oil and gas lands and
leases"). The ruling allowed the operating co-owner to file Form 1065 and an attached schedule
provided by the IRS. Id. The schedule was required to show "the [(1)] total working interest, [(2)]
names and addresses of the coowners, [(3)] the percentage of each coowner's interest in the
coownership, [(4)] total costs and expenses billed each coowner with respect to drilling for and
producing ... oil and gas, and [(5)] the total revenue credited in those cases where the operating
coowner distributed revenue to the other coowners (by way of credit or cash) from the sale or other
distribution of the coowners' oil and gas." Id. at 96-97.
84. See I.T. 3930, 1948-2 C.B. 126, 129 ("As such agreements commonly allow the
participants to take their shares of the mineral in kind (or provide for the sale of the shares of the
respective participants for their individual accounts under revocable agency powers), the sale of the
mineral, even though made by the operator, is a sale by or on behalf of the individual participants.
In such cases there is no joint profit contemplated or realized by the associates .... [l]t is held that
the participants, through the partnership thus created, individually own depletable economic interests
in the oil and gas in place and must report the proceeds therefrom as their income.").
85. See Borden, supra note 5, at 990-91 (discussing the codification of the joint-profit test).
86. This statement is true under the law of the excluded middle. See A.R. LACEY, A
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 101 (3d ed., Routledge 1996) ("Traditionally, 'A is B or A is not B'
(any given thing either has or lacks any given property), or in the propositional calculus (where 'p'
stands for a proposition) 'p or not p."').
87. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2007) (defining "corporation" for tax
purposes).
88. See Borden, supra note 5, at 994-98 (discussing pure service arrangements and the source-
of-activity test used to define tax partnership).
89. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 2006) (discussing arrangements that
"give rise to entities for federal tax purposes").
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
arrangements would be to litigate the question and rely upon the court's
holding. The uncertainty prior to such a determination raises planning
difficulties for taxpayers, who cannot know ex ante the classification of
their arrangements. 90
Members of an arrangement, the classification of which is uncertain
without a court's holding, may prefer to be exempt from subchapter K.91
Such members would realize that if the arrangement is not a tax
partnership, they will not be subject to subchapter K or other provisions
of the Code; if the arrangement is a tax partnership, they will be subject
to subchapter K, unless they make a valid section 761 election.92 They
may also understand that if they make a valid section 761 election, they
will be exempt from subchapter K, even if the arrangement is a tax
partnership. 93  If the members of an arrangement are uncertain about
whether the arrangement is a tax partnership and wish to be exempt from
subchapter K, they will make a protective section 761 election.
94
To analyze how a protective section 761 election affects the
classification of a qualified tax partnership, consider how the issue would
arise. An arrangement makes a protective section 761 election if the
members are uncertain about whether the arrangement is disregarded or
is a tax partnership. The arrangement makes a protective, as opposed to
actual, election because it provides some support for disregarded
90. The uncertainty of an arrangement's classification does not make the line between
disregarded arrangements and tax partnerships any less definite. All arrangements are either tax
partnerships or not tax partnerships. The uncertainty of an arrangement's classification relates to the
position of the line between disregarded arrangements and tax partnerships, not the definiteness of
the line. In other words, the line definitely exists, but its location is uncertain.
91. See infra Part IV (discussing the qualified tax partnership aggregate-plus tax regime and the
tax consequences of qualified tax partnership classification).
92. For example, a taxpayer acquiring an interest in co-owned rental property may prefer that
the interest not be a tax partnership so the acquisition may qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition.
See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (excluding interests in a qualified tax partnership from the scope
of section 1031).
93. See infra Part IV.
94. Some practitioners are concerned that making a protective section 761 election may cause
an arrangement to become a tax partnership. An arrangement may make a section 761 election by
filing a partnership tax return or it may make a deemed election in an un-filed document. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1995) (regarding actual elections); Id. § 1.761-2(b)(2)(ii)
(regarding deemed elections). Filing a tax return is an indicium of intent to be a partnership, but it is
not dispositive. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 558 (1979), affd, 633 F.2d
512 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he fact that the partners elected under section 761(a) not to be subject to the
provisions of subchapter K is not an admission that the arrangement is a [tax] partnership.");
Greenspon v. Comm'r, 229 F.2d 947, 951 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding that an arrangement that filed a
partnership tax return was not a tax partnership); Luna v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1077-78 (1964)
(including whether a partnership files a tax return as a factor courts consider in determining whether
an arrangement is a tax partnership). If the arrangement has no other indicia of tax partnership,
filing a protective section 761 should not cause the arrangement to be a tax partnership. To avoid
this possibility, most such arrangements make a deemed election.
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arrangement classification. If the IRS challenged that position, the
members and IRS could litigate the issue. If the conclusion of that
litigation were that the arrangement is a tax partnership, the taxpayers
would invoke the protective section 761 election and argue that the
arrangement is a qualified tax partnership. If the conclusion of the
litigation were that the arrangement is a disregarded arrangement, the
issue of the protective section 761 election and whether the arrangement
is a disregarded arrangement would never arise. Even though this is the
only acceptable conclusion, the issue is often confused.
Because the proper classification of non-corporate arrangements is
not always clear and because some arrangements that are not tax
partnerships make protective section 761 elections, some may perceive
the group of qualified tax partnerships as spanning the groups of tax
partnerships and disregarded arrangements. Under that interpretation,
some qualified tax partnerships would be within a subgroup of
disregarded arrangements, but not within the tax partnerships subgroup.
The following Venn diagram illustrates that incorrect perception.
Incorrect Perception of
Protective Section 761 Elections
The concept this diagram illustrates is inconsistent with the
definitional construct of non-corporate arrangements. Recall that the
classification system first considers whether a non-corporate
arrangement is a tax partnership or a disregarded arrangement. If the
arrangement is a tax partnership and satisfies the section 761
requirements, it may elect to be a qualified tax partnership. If an
arrangement is not a tax partnership, it has no need to make the election
2008]
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because it is not subject to the rules from which it would be electing
exemption. Finally, section 761 is a part of subchapter K,95 and because
subchapter K only applies to tax partnerships, a disregarded arrangement
could not make an effective section 761 election.96 Thus, a protective
election does not alter the groupings of non-corporate arrangements.
IV. QUALIFIED TAX PARTNERSHIP AGGREGATE-PLUS TAXATION
The definitional grouping of non-corporate arrangements helps
identify the type of arrangements that are qualified tax partnerships (in
other words, those non-corporate arrangements that are tax partnerships
and qualify to make a section 761 election). In considering qualified tax
partnership aggregate-plus taxation, recall the tax regime groupings
discussed in Part II above. Qualified tax partnerships are subject to
aggregate taxation plus some non-aggregate tax rules, but not as many
non-aggregate tax rules as tax partnerships are subject to. Tax law
creates the aggregate-plus tax regime by exempting qualified tax
partnerships from subchapter K and some other Code provisions that
generally apply to tax partnerships.
A. Exemption from Subchapter K
Qualified tax partnerships are exempt from all or a part of subchapter
K.97  Many of the provisions of subchapter K provide taxpayers
favorable tax treatment.98 Perhaps most significantly, subchapter K has
relatively lenient allocation rules.99  Members of a disregarded
arrangement, on the other hand, must allocate items of income and loss
95. Section 761 is in part III of subchapter K of the Code.
96. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 72 T.C. at 563 ("If distribution in kind of jointly produced
property is enough to avoid partnership status, we do not see how such distribution could be used as
a test for allowing an election to be excluded from the partnership provisions of subchapter K.").
This statement by the Tax Court indicates that it understands qualified tax partnerships to be a subset
of tax partnerships, i.e., tests for qualified tax partnerships would not apply in determining whether
an arrangement is a tax partnership.
97. See I.R.C. § 761(a) (2000); McMahon, supra note 32, at 21 ("Any oil and gas joint
operating agreement that is classified as a partnership rather than as an association under the rules
discussed in the preceding section may elect to be excluded from all or part of the application of
subchapter K. In practice, total exclusions are the rule.").
98. See Larason, supra note 32, at 30-31 (identifying tax advantages provided by subchapter
K).
99. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (2000) (allowing partners to determine the allocation of partnership
income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit by agreement, subject to the substantial economic effect
test).
[Vol. 56
20081 QUALIFIED TAX PARTNERSHIPS
to members of the arrangement based on their interests in the
arrangement.100
Also, the formation and dissolution of a partnership will generally be
tax free. 1' The formation of a disregarded arrangement may, however,
be a taxable event. 10 2  For example, if parties contribute non-like-kind
property to an arrangement (they exchange interests in individually-
owned property), the formation of the arrangement may be a taxable
event for each member. 0 3  Also consider a property owner who is in
need of cash to pay property tax. The property owner can contribute the
property to a partnership newly formed with someone willing to
contribute cash sufficient to cover the taxes. The formation of that
partnership will be tax free. 10 4 If the property owner instead transferred
an interest in the property to the person in exchange for the person
paying the property tax and afterwards the parties held the property as
tenants in common, the formation of the arrangement would be
taxable. 10 5  Similarly, the dissolution of a disregarded arrangement may
not be tax free. For example, assume co-owners of multiple pieces of
property decide to partition them, with each co-owner taking title to one
of the properties. If any of the co-owners take one of the properties to
hold primarily for sale, the dissolution could be taxable to such person.
0 6
100. See Borden, supra note 5, at 951-56 (comparing the partnership allocation rules to the
assignment-of-income doctrine).
101. See I.R.C. § 721(a) (2000) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any
of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest
in the partnership."); id. § 731 (a)(1) ("In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner[,]
gain shall not be recognized to such partner, except to the extent that any money distributed exceeds
the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership immediately before the
distribution .... "); id. § 73 l(a)(2) ("In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner... [,]
loss shall be not be recognized to such partner, except that upon a distribution in liquidation of a
partner's interest .... "). The admission of a partner in exchange for services may, however, be a
taxable event. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721 -1 (b)(2) (as amended in 1996) ("To the extent that the value
of such interest is: (i) [c]ompensation for services rendered to the partnership, it is a guaranteed
payment for services under section 707(c) .... ").
102. See McMahon, supra note 32, at 35-36 (providing that section 721 would not apply to the
formation of a qualified tax partnership, but the formation of oil and gas joint operating agreements
may nonetheless be tax free under the pool of capital doctrine).
103. See Borden, supra note 5, at 960-61. If the parties exchange interests in like-kind property
and both parties hold the property for productive use in a trade or business or for investment, both
before and after the exchange, the formation of the arrangement should be tax free under section
1031.
104. See I.R.C. § 72 1(a) (2000) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any
of its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest
in the partnership.").
105. See id. § 1001(a) (providing that gain or loss shall be recognized on the sale or other
disposition of property).
106. Section 1031 could apply to the dissolution of many co-ownership arrangements that are
disregarded for tax purposes if the parties satisfy the section 1031 requirements, including the
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Perhaps an arrangement could elect out of all provisions of subchapter K
other than the formation provisions and the dissolution provisions to
avoid recognition of gain or loss on formation or dissolution.10
7
Members of an arrangement who intend to allocate tax items in
proportion to their respective ownership interests in the arrangement's
property, will not otherwise receive unfavorable tax treatment, and will
not benefit from subchapter K, may prefer to elect out. A valid election
will allow them to avoid the reporting requirements subchapter K
imposes and to avoid the TEFRA audit rules.10 8 The TEFRA audit rules
may cause a tax year to remain open longer with respect to partnership
items than it would with respect to the members' individual tax items. 10 9
Thus, taxpayers may generally prefer to avoid the TEFRA rules.
These simple examples demonstrate that the members of some
arrangements would prefer to be subject to subchapter K while others
would not. The section 761 elections allow eligible tax partnerships to
decide whether to be subject to subchapter K or avoid it. While this may
simplify tax administration (a non-electing tax partnership will not be a
qualified tax partnership; a tax partnership that makes a valid section 761
election will be a qualified tax partnership),110 it may not produce
holding and use requirements. See id. § 103 1(a)(1) (requiring that an exchanger hold relinquished
property for productive use in a trade or business or for investment and acquire replacement property
to be held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment); Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B.
300 (ruling that the partition of three separate parcels of real property among tenants in common
qualifies for section 1031 nonrecognition); Rev. Rul. 57-244, 1957-1 C.B. 247 (ruling that parties
who exchanged formerly co-owned property qualified for section 1031 nonrecognition). If the
partition is of a single piece of property, then the partition may not be a sale or exchange. See I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9633028 (May 20, 1996) (ruling privately that a partition of a single piece of property
is not "a sale or exchange on which a gain or loss is realized .... "); see Borden, supra note 5, at 995
(demonstrating that if an arrangement held property primarily for sale, it probably would be a tax
partnership). Subchapter K would apply to such an arrangement. If the co-ownership held the
property for investment or leased it, the co-ownership arrangement could be disregarded. See
Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (declaring that services required to maintain
property in rental condition are not sufficient for establishing tax partnership).
107. Apparently no authority exists on this point other than section 761. Unfortunately, section
761 does not indicate out of which provisions of subchapter K an arrangement can elect and which it
can follow. Perhaps something analogous to the interdependence test would apply to provisions
within subchapter K. See infra text accompanying notes 113-15 (discussing the interdependence
test). If that test applies, those provisions that do not require the partnership to compute income or
file a tax retum could apply even though the arrangement makes a section 761 election. A
partnership generally does not recognize gain or loss on the contribution or distribution of property,
so the partnership generally should not have to compute partnership income or file a tax return if
sections 721 and 731 apply to the partnership. See supra text accompanying note 101. If a
contribution or distribution did require the partnership to compute taxable income or file a return, the
nonrecognition provisions should not apply to a qualified tax partnership.
108. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 402(a), 96 Stat.
648, 648-67 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 6221-6232 (2000)).
109. I.R.C. § 6229(a) (West 2002).
110. But see Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-Box
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equitable results (two similarly situated arrangements would be subject
to different tax treatment). 111
B. The Interdependence Test
Even if a qualified tax partnership is exempt from all of subchapter
K, other sections of the Code may recognize the qualified tax partnership
and treat it as any other tax partnership.11 2 Predicting which other Code
sections will recognize qualified tax partnerships is difficult. The IRS
has suggested that an interdependence test determines whether a
particular Code section will disregard qualified tax partnerships."1 3 As
stated by the IRS, the interdependence test provides that "if a particular
section of the Code is 'interdependent' with section 761 (a), the [qualified
tax] partnership should not be treated as a partnership for purposes of
such section."' 14 "The question in each instance is whether the limitation
or rule outside of subchapter K can be applied without doing violence to
the concept of electing out of subchapter K and computing income and
deductions at the partner level."' 1 5  Thus, the application of the
Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 405, 430-32 (2005) (arguing
that elective tax rules create complexity because they require taxpayers to analyze the different
possible alternatives).
111. See Borden, supra note 5, at 969-70 (arguing that partnership taxation should not be
elective; instead, the application of the partnership tax rules should depend upon a policy-supported
definition of tax partnership).
112. See Bryant v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 848, 864 (1966) ("The election under section 761(a) does
not operate to change the nature of the entity. A partnership remains a partnership; the exclusion
simply prevents the application of subchapter K. The partnership remains intact and other sections
of the Code are applicable as if no exclusion existed."), aff'd, 399 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1968);
McMahon, supra note 32, at 30 ("But an election under section 761(a) does not cause the
organization to cease to be a partnership for all purposes under the Code.").
113. The Tax Court is the first legal authority to introduce the concept of interdependence in the
section 761 context. The court stated, "[i]n our opinion sections 761(a) and 48(c)(2)(D) are not
interdependent. When Congress has subtitlized, subchapterized, and sectionized its treatment of a
many threaded statutory pattern like the complex Internal Revenue Code, its clear words seem to us
a safe guide to meaning." Bryant, 46 T.C. at 864.
114. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,982 (Jan. 13, 1977).
115. I.R.S. Gen Couns. Mem. 39,043 (Oct. 5, 1983). The IRS's position appears to contradict
the plain language of the Tax Court in Bryant, which provided:
[T]he Commissioner is empowered by section 761(a) to exclude a partnership 'from the
application of all or a part of this subchapter.' Such exclusion from partnership treatment
is expressly limited by the plain language of the statute. The Commissioner does not
have the authority to redefine what a partnership is; he is only empowered to exclude
partners from being treated as such under one specific subchapter.
Bryant, 46 T.C. at 864. As the court continued, however, it indicated that the purpose of the
statutory language is important: "If we were to accept the argument advanced by petitioners, we
would necessarily extend the Commissioner's power of exclusion to other sections of the Code
outside subchapter K. This we are unwilling to do because it would not be within the spirit or
intendment of the statute as enacted by Congress." Id. (emphasis added). The IRS considered the
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interdependence test turns on whether a Code section is interdependent
with section 761(a).
1. Interdependent Code Sections
Interdependent Code sections disregard qualified tax partnerships.' 16
A Code section is interdependent with section 761(a) if its application
requires qualified tax partnerships to compute partnership income or file
a partnership tax return.1 7 Under the interdependence test, any provision
of the Code that requires an election to be made by filing a return (other
than for the purpose of making an election under section 761)118 would
disregard qualified tax partnerships." 19 Thus, section 453, which applies
the installment method to dispositions by taxpayers who do not elect out
of such treatment, would disregard qualified tax partnerships. Each
member of a qualified tax partnership could individually elect out of
section 453.120 For example, assume Mark and Julie are the only
members of a qualified tax partnership that owns Knopp Farm. 12 1 Mark
and Julie agree to sell Knopp Farm to Raven. Raven will pay thirty
percent of the purchase price at closing and issue a note to Mark and
spirit and intendment of the statute in defining the interdependence test-it suggests that provisions
outside of subchapter K should not apply if they will do violence to the intendment of section 761
election.
116. A Code section that does not apply to qualified tax partnerships in effect disregards them.
Because disregarding entities is a concept known in tax law, see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-I(a)(4) (as
amended in 1996) ("[C]ertain organizations that have a single owner can choose to be recognized or
disregarded as entities separate from their owners."), this Article refers to Code sections that do not
apply to qualified tax partnerships disregarding such arrangements. See also Noah S. Baer, Oil and
Gas Transactions, 605 TAX MGM'T PORTFOLIOS A-61 ("If ['sections cannot apply without doing
violence to the concept of the section 761 election'], the sections are 'interdependent' and the
election must apply to the non-subchapter K section.") (footnotes omitted).
117. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,982 (Jan. 13, 1977).
118. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
119. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,982 (Jan. 13, 1977) (providing that section 616(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is interdependent with section 761(a) because that section required
the qualified tax partnership to file a return to make an election, and therefore section 616(b) did not
apply to the qualified tax partnership).
120. See I.R.C. § 453(d)(2) (2000) (requiring a taxpayer to make the election on or before the
due date of the taxpayer's return of the tax imposed for the taxable year of the disposition and
referring to the regulations for the manner in which the election is to be made); Treas. Reg. §
15a.453-1(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1994) (providing that a taxpayer makes the election out of the
installment sale method on the appropriate forms for the taxpayer's return or by reporting the full
face amount of an installment note as the amount realized in the year of disposition).
121. This example assumes that the arrangement is a tax partnership that may make a valid
section 761 election. A mere co-ownership would not, however, be a tax partnership. See Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1996). Thus, for the arrangement to be a tax partnership
and be eligible to make a valid section 761 election either Mark or Julie must perform some non-
business activities with respect to the property. See infra Part IV.B.3 and accompanying notes.
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Julie payable over the next ten years. Assume the sale qualifies for the
installment method.
Mark and Julie have different tax situations, so they prefer different
tax treatment on the sale of Knopp Farm. Mark has a significant amount
of loss in the current year that will offset any gain that he would realize
without the installment method. Julie wants to recognize gain on
payment of the note under the installment method. Because the qualified
tax partnership would have to file a tax return to make the election,'22
section 453 should disregard the return and Mark should be able to elect
out of section 453. Julie's choice to recognize gain under the installment
method should affect Mark's election.
This example appears to be the proper application of the
interdependence test to an interdependent section of the Code. Any other
section that requires an election to be made by filing a return would also
be interdependent with section 761 and disregard qualified tax
partnerships. 123  In each case, applying the election at the partnership
level would do violence to the concept of the exemption from subchapter
K. 12 4  Thus, the interdependence test would require such other Code
sections to disregard qualified tax partnerships. Similarly, a section that
requires an arrangement to compute taxable income should disregard
qualified tax partnerships.
2. Non-Interdependent Code Sections
A Code section is non-interdependent if it can apply without the
partnership computing income or filing a return. 125  The negative
implication of the interdependence test appears to be that non-
interdependent Code sections must recognize qualified tax
partnerships. 26  Case law and IRS rulings reveal, however, that while
122. See Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1994).
123. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168(b)(5) (2000) (allowing certain taxpayers to elect to use the 150%
declining balance or the straight line method); id. § 168(g)( 7) (allowing a taxpayer to use the
alternative depreciation system); see also id. § 1033(a)(2)(A) (allowing taxpayers who replace
involuntarily converted property within the allowed time period to elect to defer gain recognition on
such conversion); Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1981) (providing that taxpayers
make the election under section 1033 by including only the portion of undeferred gain in gross
income for the year); Morburger v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 42, 44 (W.D. Ky. 1969) (holding that
a member of a qualified tax partnership may individually elect to deduct his share of the
arrangement's intangible drilling costs).
124. See supra text accompanying note 115.
125. This is the negative proposition of the interdependence test. See supra text accompanying
note 117.
126. See supra note 115 (indicating that provisions outside of subchapter K apply to qualified
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some non-interdependent Code sections do recognize qualified tax
partnerships, others may not. Code sections that grant limited-dollar
credits may not require the computation of partnership income or the
filing of a partnership return to determine the amount of the limit.
127
Such Code sections would recognize qualified tax partnerships and apply
the dollar limit at the qualified tax partnership level. The qualified tax
partnership would then allocate the credit to its members. 128
In Madison Gas & Electric Co., the Seventh Circuit held that a co-
owned joint-production arrangement was a tax partnership and required
the arrangement's members to capitalize pre-operation expenditures
instead of allowing them to take a deduction for the cost of expansion. 
29
That same arrangement should be able to make an election under section
761(a)(2) to be a qualified tax partnership.130 Section 195, requiring
taxpayers to capitalize pre-operation expenditures, can apply even if the
arrangement does not file a tax return or compute income at the entity
level. Therefore, section 195 is not interdependent with section 761, and
the interdependence test does not require section 195 to disregard
qualified tax partnerships. Furthermore, applying section 195 to a
qualified tax partnership would not do violence to the concept of electing
out of subchapter K. Thus, section 195 should always recognize
qualified tax partnerships and treat pre-operation as start-up
expenditures, not expansion Costs. 131
tax partnerships); Borden, supra note 5, at 949, n.l 12 ("If, however, the other section is not
interdependent with section 761(a), the qualified partnership will be treated as a partnership for
purposes of such other section .... But see I.R.C. § 1031 (a)(2)(D) (2000) (disregarding a qualified
tax partnership for section 1031 purposes)."); Borden, supra note 32, at 57 ("Several sections of the
Code are not interdependent with § 761(a) and therefore will treat qualified partnerships as
partnerships for purposes of the other sections.").
127. Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30 (ruling that the former section 48(c)(2)(A) dollar
limitation for used property credit applied at the partnership level).
128. Id. The members of a qualified tax partnership would, of course, prefer that the Code
section granting the credit disregard the qualified tax partnership so the members could individually
take the full amount of the credit, instead of dividing it among themselves.
129. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980) ("We hold
therefore that MGE's joint venture with WPS and WPL constitutes a partnership within the meaning
of Sections 7701(a)(2) and 761(a) of the Code."). The taxpayers in Madison Gas & Electric Co.
made a section 761(a)(2) election. Id. at 516 n.2. On appeal the taxpayer argued that the Tax
Court's holding was inconsistent with the purpose of section 76 1(a). Id. Because the taxpayer failed
to raise that issue in the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit did not consider whether a valid section 761
election would have affected its decision. Id. The court did note, however, that section 7701(a)(2)
applies for purposes of all sections of the Code and section 761 provides for an election out of only
subchapter K. Id.
130. See Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569 ("[T]he language of the section contemplates that
eligibility to make the election may be present. . . so long as they otherwise meet the requirements
of the regulations.").
131. Even though the court in Madison Gas & Electric Co. did not consider the possible result of
an arrangement that makes a valid section 761 election, it indicated that the section 7701(a)(2)
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Other Code sections would also be non-interdependent with section
761. For example, the sections governing the character of gain
recognized on the disposition of a partnership interest can be applied
without computing income at the partnership level and without requiring
the arrangement to file a tax return.1 32 Nonetheless, the character of gain
recognized on the disposition of qualified tax partnership property should
depend upon the member's holding intent, not the arrangement's.
133
Also, the definition of self-employment income in section 1402 does not
require qualified tax partnerships to compute income at the arrangement
level or file a partnership tax return. 34 Section 1402 thus appears to be
non-interdependent and could apply without doing violence to the
section 761 election. Although these and other Code sections are not
interdependent with section 761(a), policy does not always support
recognition of qualified tax partnerships. 35  Therefore, the negative
implication of the interdependence test (that all non-interdependent Code
sections must recognize qualified tax partnerships) may not be correct.
3. Specific Overrides
The interdependence test would not apply to any Code section that
specifically overrides the test. For example, section 1031(a)(2)(D),
which disqualifies interests in partnerships from section 1031
nonrecognition,136 does not appear to be interdependent with section 761.
A qualified tax partnership does not have to compute income or file a tax
definition would apply for purposes of analyzing the proper treatment of pre-operation costs. See
supra note 129 (noting that section 7701(a)(2) applies for purposes of all Code sections).
Determining whether an expenditure is deductible or must be capitalized does not require the
arrangement to compute taxable income or file a tax return. Therefore, as the text states, the
capitalization rules are not interdependent with section 761. Thus, the court's decision should have
been the same, even if it had considered the issue in the context of a valid section 761 election.
132. See, e.g., Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that the loss from
the sale of rental real property held by tenants in common for use in a trade or business was ordinary
under section 1231, but if relevant Code sections had recognized the partnership, the sale would
have been of a partnership interest and the loss may have been a capital loss that the taxpayer could
have carried forward to a subsequent year). Although this case did not involve a qualified tax
partnership (the court held that the arrangement was not a tax partnership), the same result should
obtain if the partnership at issue had been a qualified tax partnership.
133. See McMahon, supra note 32, at 33 ("Clearly, if an interest in an electing out partnership is
sold, the transaction should be treated as a sale of the underlying property, not a partnership
interest."); infra text accompanying note 202 (discussing the result when the character of gain or loss
is determined at the arrangement level).
134. See Cokes v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 222, 232 (1988) (recognizing a qualified tax partnership for
purposes of applying the section 1402 definition of self-employment income).
135. See supra Part IV.B.I.
136. I.R.C. § 1031 (a)(2)(D) (2000).
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return for its members to have interests in it. 137 Nonetheless, Congress
treats section 1031 as interdependent with section 761(a) by disregarding
qualified tax partnerships and treating their members as directly owning
the assets of the qualified tax partnership. 138  Therefore, Congress
specifically overrode the interdependence test in this situation.
C. Qualified Tax Partnership Hybridism
Because of interdependence, a qualified tax partnership is a hybrid of
a tax partnership and a disregarded arrangement. If a qualified tax
partnership is exempt from all of the provisions in subchapter K, then it
looks more like a disregarded arrangement than a tax partnership.
Nonetheless, some non-interdependent Code sections continue to apply
to qualified tax partnerships. 39 In this respect, the hybridism of qualified
tax partnerships resembles the hybridism of S corporations. S
corporations are exempt from some entity tax provisions: for example,
income, gain, loss, deductions, and credits flow through to
shareholders.1 40  Nonetheless, S corporations remain subject to many
entity tax provisions.'14  Thus, S corporations are a hybrid of C
corporations and tax partnerships. Similarly, qualified tax partnerships
are exempt from many of the partnership tax rules, but remain subject to
at least some non-interdependent Code sections. Thus, qualified tax
partnerships are a hybrid of tax partnerships and disregarded multiple-
member arrangements. The following Venn diagram illustrates the
hybridism of qualified tax partnerships.
137. See id. § 76 l(a) (definition of partnership lacks any requirement of income computation or
a filed tax return).
138. Congress added the provision as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11703(d)(1), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-517.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 125-35.
140. See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2000) ("[A]n S corporation shall not be subject to the taxes imposed
by this chapter."); id. § 1366(a)(1)(AHB) (requiring S corporation shareholders to take into account
that corporation's "items of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or credit the
separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder, and...
nonseparately computed income or loss").
141. See id. § 1371(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, and except to the extent
inconsistent with this subchapter, subchapter C shall apply to an S corporation and its
shareholders.").
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The definition of qualified tax partnership determines which tax
partnerships may be exempt from subchapter K and disregarded in other
provisions of the Code. That classification may have significant tax
consequences. 142  Thus, it is an important definition. Furthermore,
because the effect of the definition of qualified tax partnership is to
exempt tax partnerships from subchapter K and other provisions of the
Code, the definition should reflect policy considerations that justify such
exemption.
V. POLICY ANALYSIS OF QUALIFIED TAX PARTNERSHIPS
Tax policy justifies the existence of qualified tax partnerships only if
they are sufficiently different from both tax partnerships and disregarded
arrangements to warrant a special regime. 143 If tax partnerships are not
sufficiently different from other arrangements, their existence adds
complexity to tax law and may result in similarly situated taxpayers
being treated differently for tax purposes. Thus, the policy analysis of
qualified tax partnerships compares them to tax partnerships and then
compares them to disregarded arrangements. If they are not sufficiently
142. See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting
the amount of potential deduction at issue was $33,418.45 and $114,434.27 for 1969 and 1970
respectively).
143. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1002-06 (discussing the application of horizontal equity).
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different from both types of arrangements, they should not exist. Instead,
they should be subsumed by the type of arrangement to which they are
most similar.
A. Comparison of Tax Partnerships and Qualified Tax Partnerships
The IRS has stated that the interdependence test prevents certain
Code sections from doing violence to the purpose of section 761.144 That
reasoning is consistent with the stated purpose of section 761:145 to
alleviate the hardship caused by Bentex Oil Corp. v. Commissioner. 46 In
Bentex Oil, the Tax Court held that a co-owned joint-production
arrangement was a tax partnership, which subjected the arrangement to
subchapter K.147  Subchapter K requires tax partnerships to compute
taxable income. Co-owned joint-production arrangements cannot,
however, easily compute taxable income. 149  The co-owners, not the
arrangement, own the product of the arrangement. 50  Because the
arrangement does not own the product, the arrangement never has an
accession to wealth that it clearly realizes and over which it has complete
dominion.151 Thus, the arrangement does not have gross income and
cannot compute taxable income.15 2  Instead, the co-owners recognize
income individually when they separately sell the product. The
following diagram illustrates the Bentex Oil hardship.
144. Supra note 115.
145. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 515-16 ("Section [761(a)] has generally been
interpreted, in the absence of any legislative history, as approving the Bentex decision while
providing relief from certain resulting hardships .... This interpretation is surely correct ... 
(citations omitted)).
146. 20 T.C. 565 (1953).
147. ld. at 571.
148. I.R.C. § 703(a) (2000).
149. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1019-23 (describing the steps necessary for such a
calculation).
150. Borden, supra note 5, at 1022.
151. See Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining gross income).
152. See I.R.C. § 63(a) (2000) (defining taxable income as gross income minus allowed
deductions).
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Because production qualified tax partnerships cannot compute gross
income at the arrangement level, treating them as tax partnerships and
requiring them to compute taxable income and file a partnership tax
return would create a hardship. The inability to compute income at the
partnership level is sufficient justification to treat qualified tax
partnerships and other tax partnerships differently. 5 3 Thus, the purpose
of section 761 is to exclude qualified tax partnerships (arrangements
which cannot compute taxable income) from subchapter K. That
exclusion alleviates the Bentex Oil hardship.
The interdependence test piggy-backs on the purpose of section 761.
As stated above, the interdependence test requires Code sections to
disregard qualified tax partnerships if recognizing them would do
violence to the purpose of section 761.54 In other words, if another
section of the Code would require a qualified tax partnership to compute
taxable income or file a partnership tax return, that other section of the
153. A principal policy justification for partnership taxation is that it alleviates administrative
inconvenience. See Borden, supra note 5, at 943-44. If the arrangement has no partnership income,
then the inconveniences partnership tax rules were enacted to alleviate do not exist. Furthermore,
requiring such an arrangement to compute taxable income would add an inconvenience. Similarly, a
co-ownership arrangement cannot compute taxable income because co-owners, not the arrangement,
own the proceeds from the property. Therefore, requiring such an arrangement to compute taxable
income would create, not alleviate, administrative inconvenience.
154. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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Code should disregard the qualified tax partnership. Thus, the
interdependence test helps alleviate the Bentex Oil hardship and has
policy support. Because the interdependence test has policy support, it
justifies interdependent sections of the Code treating qualified tax
partnerships differently from tax partnerships.
Instead of creating qualified tax partnerships, Congress could have
narrowed the statutory definition of tax partnership to exclude
arrangements that fall under the current definition of qualified tax
partnership. If Congress had done that, non-corporate arrangements
would consist of only tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements.
Disregarded arrangements would include all arrangements that would
otherwise be subject to the Bentex Oil hardship.
Congress did not, however, amend the statutory definition of tax
partnership. Instead, it created qualified tax partnerships. If Congress
based that decision on sound tax policy, the only explanation is that
qualified tax partnerships are sufficiently different from disregarded
arrangements to justify treating the two types of arrangements
differently. The analysis thus compares qualified tax partnerships and
disregarded arrangements to determine whether they are sufficiently
different to warrant different tax treatment. If not, the existence of
qualified tax partnerships is not justified.
B. Comparison of Disregarded Arrangements and Qualified Tax
Partnerships
The Bentex hardship-alleviation purpose and the interdependence test
only justify treating qualified tax partnerships and tax partnerships
differently. They do not justify treating qualified tax partnerships and
disregarded arrangements differently. 55  Policy requires treating
qualified tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements differently only
if the difference between them justifies different tax treatment.'56
Subchapter K and interdependent Code sections treat qualified tax
partnerships and disregarded arrangements the same: they disregard both
types of arrangements. Only non-interdependent Code sections treat
qualified tax partnerships and disregarded arrangements differently. The
155. The court in Madison Gas & Electric Co. used a pure legal analysis to hold that the
arrangement was a tax partnership. It considered the definition of joint profit and, finding that the
arrangement had a joint profit under the dictionary definition of profit, held that the arrangement was
a tax partnership. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980);
Borden, supra note 5, at 990. The court did not consider whether tax policy supported its decision.
If it had, it should have drawn a different conclusion. See Borden, supra note 5, at 10 17-23.
156. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1002-06.
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analysis thus examines non-interdependent Code sections and considers
whether tax policy supports their treating qualified tax partnerships and
disregarded entities differently. If comparing qualified tax partnerships
to disregarded arrangements reveals that different tax treatment is not
justified, the courts in Bentex and Madison Gas & Electric Co. created a
definition of tax partnership that is too broad.
157
The applicability of non-interdependent Code sections to qualified
tax partnerships has not been at issue in many cases or rulings. Case law
provides that certain investment credit Code sections and employment
tax Code sections recognize qualified tax partnerships. 158 Case law also
implies that certain capitalization provisions would recognize qualified
tax partnerships. 59  Beyond that limited authority, nothing appears to
specifically address other non-interdependent Code sections.
Nonetheless, the interdependence test suggests that all non-
interdependent Code sections recognize qualified tax partnerships. The
following analysis considers Code sections directly addressed by case
law and the gain/loss characterization Code sections. Considering these
provisions illuminates weaknesses within the interdependence test. The
analysis demonstrates that some non-interdependent provisions should
recognize qualified tax partnerships, but others should not.
1. Credit Limits
The investment credit Code section that recognized qualified tax
partnerships was property specific. The Code section allowed a tax
credit of up to $50,000 based upon the cost of a piece of property. 160
Because the credit was property specific, allowing each member of a
qualified tax partnership to take the full amount of the credit would have
157. Indeed, policy does not appear to support including co-owned joint-production
arrangements as tax partnerships. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1028 (proposing a definition of tax
partnership that would exclude investment qualified tax partnerships (by requiring that at least one
member provide significant services) and production qualified tax partnerships (by requiring the
members to have common gross income) from the definition of tax partnership).
158. See Bryant v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 800, 806 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that the $50,000 credit
limit in section 48(c)(2) of the 1954 Code applies at the partnership level of a qualified tax
partnership); Cokes v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 222, 229 (1988) (holding that section 1401 (imposing tax on
self-employment income) recognizes qualified tax partnerships); Rev. Rul. 65-118, 1965-1 C.B. 30,
31 (ruling that the $50,000 credit limit in section 48(c)(2)(D) of the 1954 Code applies at the level of
a qualified tax partnership).
159. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 (holding that a co-owned joint-production
arrangement was a tax partnership for purposes of determining whether certain pre-operation costs
were start-up expenditures or expansion costs, and whether the arrangement had made a valid
section 761 election was irrelevant).
160. See I.R.C. § 48(a)(2)(D) (1963).
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multiplied the credit and neglected the purpose of the credit. It would
have treated multiple owners of a single piece of property differently
from a single owner of the same piece of property. That result would
have been undesirable.
Other credit limits are not property specific and applying them at the
partnership level of a qualified tax partnership would produce an
unsupportable result. One example of an owner-specific credit limit is
the low-income housing credit, which allows a credit based upon the
qualified basis of each low-income building. 161 If the building is owned
by several members of a qualified tax partnership, each member will take
a separate basis in its interest in the property. 162 If the members do not
acquire their interests simultaneously, or if some of them are subject to
different depreciation rules, then their respective interests may have
different bases. If that is the case, the interdependence test should not
require the arrangement to determine the amount of the credit at the
arrangement level. Instead, the members should individually determine
the amount of credit available according to their respective interests and
take the credit individually.
The members' proportionate shares of the property's aggregate basis
may not equal their proportionate shares of the property's fair market
value. Determining the credit amount at the arrangement level would
produce a poor result if the arrangement allocated the credit based on the
members' share of the value of the property. 163 Thus, the low-income
housing credit Code provisions should disregard qualified tax
partnerships and apply the credit at the member level.
This discussion reveals that a general rule applicable to all tax credits
is not workable. Some credit provisions should recognize qualified tax
partnerships, others should not. Whether the particular provision should
recognize qualified tax partnerships depends upon whether the amount of
the credit derives from the property itself or from some other factor, such
as the property's basis.
Tax policy appears to support the application of property-specific
credits at the arrangement level of qualified tax partnerships. It does not,
however, appear to support applying owner-specific credits at the
161. Id. § 42(a).
162. Assuming the qualified tax partnership's election was effective for all provisions in
subchapter K, section 722 would not apply, and each partner would have an adjusted tax basis in the
separately owned property interest under section 1011.
163. If the arrangement is not subject to the partnership allocation rules, the arrangement should
allocate all tax items to its members based on their respective shares in the property. The bases the
members had in their respective property interests should not affect their shares in the property. See
Borden, supra note 5, at 951-56.
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qualified tax partnership level. Instead, policy suggests that owner-
specific credits should apply at the member level of qualified tax
partnerships. Because property-specific provisions of the Code apply to
the property, the existence or nonexistence of a qualified tax partnership
should not affect the application of the provision. Thus, the application
of the provision is not affected by an arrangement's tax classification.
2. Self-Employment Tax Provisions
Self-employed individuals must pay tax on self-employment income
in an amount equal to the aggregate employment taxes an employee and
employer pay. 64 Self-employment income includes a partner's
distributive share of partnership taxable income or loss from any trade or
business. 165  This rule appears to require the partnership to compute
income at the partnership level. Nonetheless, the Tax Court held that
income allocated to an individual member of a production qualified tax
partnership is self-employment income, even though the member did not
participate in the management of the arrangement. 166  Income to
members of investment clubs, however, is not self-employment income
because such arrangements do not engage in business activity. 167 Thus,
the applicability of the definition of self-employment income to items of
a qualified tax partnership appears to depend upon the type of qualified
tax partnership. The income of a production qualified tax partnership
would be self-employment income to its individual members. The
income of an investment qualified tax partnership would not be self-
employment income to its individual members. Part of the reason for the
distinction must be that investment qualified tax partnerships only
conduct investment activities, which do not generate self-employment
income. 168
Characterizing income from a production qualified tax partnership as
self-employment income may be justified. 169  Income allocated to an
164. See I.R.C. § 1401(a) (2000) (imposing a tax of 12.4% on self-employment income); id. §
1401(b) (imposing a tax of 2.9% on self-employment income).
165. See id. § 1402(a) (referring to section 702(a)(8) to define partnership taxable income). But
see also id. § 1402(a)(13) (excluding from the definition of self-employment income a limited
partner's distributive share of any item of gain or loss of a limited partnership other than guaranteed
payments under section 707(c)).
166. Cokes v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 222, 233-36 (1988).
167. Rev. Rul. 75-525, 1975-2 C.B. 350.
168. See supra note 67.
169. This statement assumes the arrangement has income. If the arrangement has income,
perhaps it does not distribute product to its members in kind but sells it on behalf of the arrangement.
If that were the case, the arrangement should not be a qualified tax partnership. See supra notes 73-
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individual member of a general partnership that conducts business
activity would be self-employment income under the statutory
definition.170  Disregarded entities may also engage in business
activity. 171 Income from a disregarded arrangement that engages in
business activity should be self-employment income to the individual
members of the arrangement under the statutory definition of self-
employment income. 172 The classification of an arrangement as either a
tax partnership or a disregarded arrangement does not affect whether
income to the members of the arrangement is self-employment
income. 173 Instead, the nature of the arrangement's activities determines
whether the income is self-employment income. 174  Therefore, income
from a qualified tax partnership should be self-employment income, if
the income allocated to an individual member is income from the
arrangement's business activity. Such activity-specific Code provisions
do not depend upon the arrangement's classification.
3. Pre-Operating Costs
Requiring the members of a qualified tax partnership to capitalize
pre-operating costs while allowing members of a disregarded
arrangement to deduct the same costs is not equitable. The following
77 and accompanying text. The Tax Court appeared to rule on the self-employment income issue
assuming the arrangement was a qualified tax partnership. See Cokes, 91 T.C. at 231. If the
arrangement had not been a qualified tax partnership, it would have been a general partnership
treated as a tax partnership for tax purposes, and the result would have been the same. Id.
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Pinchot v. Comm'r, 113 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1940) ("What was done was more
than the investment and re-investment of funds in real estate. It was the management of the real
estate itself for profit .... It necessarily involved alterations and repairs commensurate with the
value and number of buildings cared for and such transactions as were necessary constitute a
recognized form of business. The management of real estate on such a scale for income producing
purposes required regular and continuous activity of the kind which is commonly concerned with the
employment of labor; the purchase of materials; the making of contracts; and many other things
which come within the definition of business .. "); Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir.
1953) (declaring that holding business property as tenants in common is not sufficient for
establishing a tax partnership and holding loss recognized by the members of the disregarded
arrangement was loss from the sale of property used in a trade or business); Hazard v. Comsn'r, 7
T.C. 372, 375-76 (1946) (holding that the property owner held rental property for use in a trade or
business, even though business activity appears to have been minimal); Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2
C.B. 261 (ruling that a co-ownership was not a tax partnership, because the member-hired manager
who provided customary tenant services was not the members' agent).
172. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) (2000) ("The term 'net earnings from self employment' means the
gross income derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such
individual ... ").
173. See id. (failing to distinguish between tax partnerships and disregarded entities in
calculating net earnings from self-employment).
174. Id.
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comparison of two hypothetical arrangements illustrates the inequity.
Alpha and Omega start Saturn Power Co., an electrical production
qualified tax partnership.175 Alpha is a utility company with several
other power plants. Because Saturn Power Co. is a qualified tax
partnership, Alpha would be required to capitalize any pre-operating
costs it incurs jointly to start Saturn Power Co. with Omega, such as
employee training'
76
Beta and Zeta acquire Zeus Apartments and hire Matt to manage
Zeus Apartments. Before getting their first tenant, Beta and Zeta incur
costs to train Matt. The Beta-Zeta arrangement is disregarded for tax
purposes. 177 Beta owns several apartment complexes. Beta's interest in
Zeus Apartments is an expansion of Beta's apartment owning business,
so Beta should be able to currently deduct pre-operating costs of Zeus
Apartments. 178 Tax policy analysis should turn on whether Saturn Power
Co. and Zeus Apartments are sufficiently different to justify different tax
treatment. 1
79
175. The arrangement should be a tax partnership. Even though in Madison Gas & Electric
Company, the Seventh Circuit held that the arrangement was a tax partnership, it did not consider
whether the arrangement qualified for the section 761 election. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 516, n.2 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that the availability of the section 761
election was not at issue in the case); Rev. Rul. 68-344, 1968-1 C.B. 569 (providing that a co-owned
joint-production arrangement may make the section 761 election).
176. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 (finding that the joint venture qualified as a
partnership, and that its pre-operational costs were therefore non-deductible "start-up costs of the
partnership venture"). Section 195 requires taxpayers to capitalize start-up expenditures and then
allows them to amortize such costs. 1.R.C. § 195 (2000). Thus, if Madison Gas & Electric
Company is good law, Alpha would be required to capitalize the costs of formation and pre-
operating costs, even if section 709(b) is inapplicable because the arrangement is a qualified tax
partnership.
177. See Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that services required to
maintain property in rental condition are not sufficient to create a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 75-374,
1975-2 C.B. 261 (ruling that an arrangement that hires a third party to provide customary tenant
services is not a tax partnership). Under these authorities, Beta and Zeta should be able to pay a
manager to provide customary tenant services without converting the arrangement to a tax
partnership. If that requires they pay for manager training, the amount should not be a start-up cost
for Beta because Zeus Apartments is an expansion of Beta's apartment-renting business. See infra
note 178 and accompanying text.
178. See Malmstedt v. Comm'r, 578 F.2d 520, 526-27 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that a taxpayer
who had previously developed residential property could deduct costs incurred in a failed
commercial development); Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2d 775, 787 (2d Cir. 1973)
(allowing a deduction for costs incurred to expand an existing business to different locations); York
v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421, 422 (4th Cir. 1958) (holding that taxpayers who engaged in the
"development, management, and improvement of real estate generally, but not including industrial
properties" could deduct costs incurred to study industrial possibilities of other property; and holding
that sharing the cost of the study with another did not alter the character of the expenditure as "that
was but an economy").
179. The criteria used to assess whether the two arrangements are sufficiently different should
reflect the purpose for the underlying statute. See Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind Exchange
Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (providing examples of absurd results that
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Based on its decision in Madison Gas & Electric Co., the Seventh
Circuit would treat Saturn Power Co. as a tax partnership because the
arrangement comes within the substantive law definition of partnership
under its interpretation of joint-profit motive.' 80 The court did not appear
to consider whether its conclusion was correct from a policy
perspective; 181 it merely looked at the unclear definition of tax
partnership and formulated a new interpretation of it. 182 After holding
that the arrangement was a tax partnership, the court felt bound to
preclude the deduction of the pre-operation costs. 83 The court should
have considered whether the tax treatment of the arrangement should
more fully reflect that of disregarded arrangements or that of tax
partnerships in making its determination.
The structure of the arrangement in Madison Gas & Electric Co.
gave the members an undivided interest in the property, entitled the
members to receive a share of power produced in kind, and required each
member to pay a share of the arrangement's operating costs.' 84  The
taxpayer in the case joined the arrangement to obtain power needed to
service the growing population within the area it was "required to furnish
[with] reasonably adequate service and facilities ... at rates found
reasonable and just by the PSC."' 85 Prior to joining that arrangement, the
taxpayer had kept up with the increasing power demand "by expanding
the generating capacity of its facilities, contracting for the purchase and
sale of excess electrical power, interconnecting transmission facilities
with those of other Wisconsin utilities, and finally by building and
operating additional facilities in conjunction with other utilities. 186 The
facts appear to demonstrate a clear business expansion, and therefore, the
costs incurred prior to the operation should be deductible.187
obtain if criteria for comparison are not based on legitimate standards).
180. See Borden, supra note 5, at 989-91 (revealing that the Seventh Circuit found the co-owned
joint-production arrangement had the requisite joint-profit motive and was, therefore, a partnership).
181. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 ("At bottom, MGE's position is that it is not
sound policy to treat the entity here as a partnership. But we are not free to rewrite the tax laws,
whatever the merits of MGE's position.").
182. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1017-23 (demonstrating the definition of profit the Seventh
Circuit used produces an unworkable definition of tax partnership under a policy analysis).
183. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 ("Under the Internal Revenue Code the joint
venture here is a partnership and the expenses were non-deductible, pre-operational start-up costs of
the partnership venture.").
184. Seeid. at513-14.
185. Id. at 513.
186. Id. In fact, all of the members were already in the business of selling electricity before they
formed the arrangement. Id. at 517.
187. See supra note 178.
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The court's rationale (which the author questions)188 for holding that
the arrangement in Madison Gas & Electric Co. was a tax partnership
should have no bearing on its decision regarding the deductibility of the
arrangement's pre-operating costs. Each member of the arrangement
joined the arrangement for the sole purpose of expanding existing
businesses.' 8 9 They each owned an interest in the facilities, and they
each took power from the facilities to sell to customers.' 90  The
arrangement was merely another way for the members to obtain
electrical power needed to expand existing business operations. The
mere fact that the members were able to share economies of scale by
joining together should not have obscured the fact that they each acted to
expand existing businesses.1 91  Because the arrangement was not
established for the sake of the arrangement, but for the individual
purposes of the arrangement's members, the court should have treated
the members of the arrangement as though they were members of a
disregarded arrangement. Thus, policy suggests that for purposes of
determining the deductibility of pre-operating costs, qualified tax
partnerships should be subject to the rules that govern disregarded
arrangements.
4. Gain/Loss Characterization
The character of gain or loss recognized on the disposition of
property depends upon the purpose and amount of time for which the
owner holds the property.' 92 The following example demonstrates the
potential result if the gain/loss characterization Code provisions
recognize qualified tax partnerships. Clyde and Devon co-own a piece of
raw land in a disregarded arrangement. Clyde and Devon do not have
any intention to develop the property, do not advertise it for resale
together, and do not own any other property together. Clyde is a dentist
and purchased his share of the land to hold as an investment. Clyde's
188. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1017-23.
189. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 633 F.2d at 517 (noting each participant's possible motive to
expand existing business).
190. See id at 513 (stating that each member used the facilities' power as they did the power
produced by their own facilities).
191. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 521, 565 (1979) ("In the instant case, the
economies of scale involved in a jointly owned nuclear power plant were the reason for the joint
venture which we have held to be a partnership for Federal income tax purposes."), aff'd, 633 F.2d
512 (7th Cir. 1980).
192. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (2000) (providing favorable tax rates to adjusted net capital gain);
id. § 1222(11) (defining net capital gain as the excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-
term capital loss).
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interest in the property is a capital asset to him. 193 If Clyde holds the
interest for more than one year, any gain he recognizes on the disposition
of the interest should be subject to favorable long-term capital gains
rates.
Devon on the other hand, is a dealer in real property. He purchased
the interest in the raw land as part of his inventory. He actively markets
the interest. Therefore the interest is not a capital asset to him, 194 and any
gain he recognizes on the disposition of the interest should be taxed at
ordinary income rates.'
1 95
If this arrangement between Clyde and Devon were a tax partnership,
each individual would take a basis in his respective partnership
interest, 196 and the partnership would take a basis in the raw land. 197 The
partnership would have to recognize any gain or loss on the disposition
of the property'98 (which it would allocate to Clyde and Devon), 199 and
Clyde and Devon would have to recognize gain on the sale of their
respective partnership interests if either were to sell his interest.200 The
character of the gain or loss on the partnership's disposition of the
property would be determined at the partnership level.20 1 Thus, if the
partnership were to sell the property and recognize long-term capital
gain, that character would flow through to both Clyde and Devon. That
result is different than if the arrangement was disregarded.
If instead of being a tax partnership or disregarded arrangement, the
arrangement were a qualified tax partnership,20 2 the law does not
specifically provide which rules would apply. The existence of a rule in
subchapter K providing that character of gain or loss is determined at
partnership level and flows through to the partners indicates that, even in
the tax partnership context, the appropriate rule with respect to tax
partnerships would be unclear without specific legislation. In the
absence of a clear rule, member-level determination is appropriate.
Without subchapter K, the members of the arrangement would directly
own their interests in the property for tax purposes. Determining the
193. Id. § 1221(a).
194. Id. § 1221(a)(2).
195. Id. § 1(h).
196. Id. § 722.
197. Id. § 723.
198. Id. § 703(a).
199. Id. § 702(a).
200. Id. § 741.
201. Id. § 702(b).
202. The arrangement could be a tax partnership if the members contribute investment activities
under Revenue Rulings 75-523 and 75-525. See supra note 67.
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character of gain or loss at the entity level would be inconsistent with
that ownership. The members would have difficulty determining
whether Clyde's or Devon's holding purpose and period should
determine the character of the gain at the arrangement level. Thus, the
gain/loss character provisions of the Code should disregard qualified tax
partnerships, even if they are not interdependent with section 761.
In sum, comparing qualified tax partnerships to tax partnerships and
disregarded arrangements reveals that the difference between qualified
tax partnerships and tax partnerships justifies treating them differently.
In particular, the Bentex Oil hardship alleviation purpose justifies the
different tax treatment.2 °3 The comparison does not appear to reveal a
justification for treating qualified tax partnerships and disregarded
arrangements differently. The following diagram depicts the comparison
of qualified tax partnerships to tax partnerships and disregarded
arrangements.
Comparative Justification of
Qualified Tax Partnerships
MTsred, ? Chiified Tax Benteex Oil a
Afanemt Pahnwships rip aitnedpsv ._J alevtaton
VI. PROPOSALS
The above analysis demonstrates that the current qualified tax
partnership classification rules are flawed. It also demonstrates that the
interdependence test produces inconsistent and inappropriate results.
Therefore, the system is ripe for repair. The goal of modifications should
be to group arrangements in a manner that rules applicable to the
arrangements within each group are supported by sound tax policy
considerations.
A universal solution would require narrowing the definition of tax
partnership to exclude those arrangements that currently come within the
definition of qualified tax partnership. If that solution is not palatable for
203. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
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some reason, Treasury should expand the definition of qualified tax
partnership. Provisions outside subchapter K should apply on a
property-specific or activity-specific basis, not under the interdependence
test. Finally, Congress should eliminate the election out of subchapter K
and make the exemption mandatory for any arrangement that comes
within the modified definition of qualified tax partnership.
A. Narrow the Definition of Tax Partnership
Narrowing the definition of tax partnership would simplify the tax
entity classification by eliminating one tax entity. More importantly, it
would serve significant policy objectives. The current broad definition
of tax partnership includes arrangements that cannot compute income at
the entity level.2°4 The definition of tax partnership should be narrowed
to exclude those arrangements. This narrowing would exclude co-owned
joint-production arrangements from the definition of tax partnership.
The definition of tax partnership also includes arrangements that
have no need for subchapter K. For example, an arrangement that only
has investment income should be required to allocate that income to its
members based on each member's interest in the arrangement's
underlying assets. Investment-income arrangements should not be given
the opportunity to use the partnership tax allocation rules. 20 5 Narrowing
the definition of tax partnership to exclude such arrangements would
exclude investment clubs from the definition of tax partnership.
The definition of tax partnership, if modified to reflect these
proposals, would provide "a tax partnership is two or more persons, at
least one of whom provides significant services, who have (or will have)
common gross income., 20 6 This definition would exclude co-owned
joint-production arrangements because such arrangements do not have
gross income. Instead, the members have separate, not common, gross
income from the arrangement. The proposed definition would exclude
investment clubs because none of the members perform significant
services under the section 162 definition of business activity. Although
this proposed definition would serve several policy objectives, it is not
the current law.
204. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1018-22.
205. See id. at 970.
206. See id. at 1028 (emphasis in original omitted).
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B. Alternatively, Expand the Definition of Qualified Tax Partnership
Expanding the definition of qualified tax partnership is an alternative
way to accomplish policy objectives. To the extent the section 761
regulations are valid,2 °7 they create a fairly narrow definition of qualified
tax partnership. The two definitional elements of qualified tax
partnerships that unduly narrow the definition are (1) the requirement
that members of a qualified tax partnership co-own property,20 s and (2)
the requirement that they be able to alienate their interests.20 9 Tax policy
does not support either requirement. Nor are they found in the statutory
definitions of qualified tax partnership. 210 The restrictive nature of those
provisions prevents several arrangements from qualifying for subchapter
K exemption. The result is that some arrangements are subject to
subchapter K in the face of contrary policy. Therefore, Treasury should
eliminate both requirements.
1. Eliminate the State-Law Classification Requirement
The requirement that the property owners own property as co-owners
prevents them from holding property indirectly in a state-law entity.
This appears to be either an adoption of the estoppel test, which courts
use to prevent taxpayers from disclaiming tax partnership
classification,2 11 or a relic from rulings and cases that cling to state-law
classification when considering whether an arrangement is a tax
partnership. 212 The Supreme Court has ruled that state-law classification
207. Perhaps one could successfully argue that the regulations are invalid because they do not
reasonably interpret section 761. The co-ownership prohibition and alienability requirement are not
found in the statutory definition of qualified tax partnership and do not reflect the current definition
of tax partnership. Thus, the regulations may be an unreasonable interpretation of the statutory
definition.
208. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.761-2(a)(2)(i) to 2(a)(3)(i) (as amended in 1995).
209. Id. §§ 1.761-2(a)(2)(ii) to 2(a)(3)(ii).
210. I.R.C. § 761(a)(1), (2) (2000).
211. See, e.g., Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 97-98 (9th Cir. 1952) (taking into
consideration the state-law classification of an arrangement to estop the taxpayer from disclaiming
tax partnership classification); see also Borden, supra note 5, at 1000-01.
212. See, e.g., Joe Balestrieri & Co. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1949) (holding the
arrangement was not a tax partnership because it did not satisfy the California definition of joint
venture); Comm'r v. Olds, 60 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1932) (relying upon Michigan law); Copeland
v. Ratterree, Civil No. 5215, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4556, *12 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 1957) (reasoning
that because the arrangement was made in Vermont it should be classified according to Vermont
laws); Estate of Appleby v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 18, 20 (1940) (holding arrangement not a tax
partnership based on tenancy-in-common status under state law), aff'd, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941),
see also Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 486 (2000) (relying upon state law classification
to hold that a tax partnership existed for purposes of applying the minority discount to determine the
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does not govern tax partnership classification,23 and Treasury adopted
that rule in the check-the-box regulations. 1 4  Thus, state-law
classification does not determine whether an arrangement is a tax
partnership. The reason for disregarding state law in the definition of tax
partnership also applies to the definition of qualified tax partnership.
Applying state law as a test for tax partnership and qualified tax
partnership creates administrative complexity and inequity.215 Because
each state's definition of partnership may be different, applying a state-
law test to the definition of qualified tax partnership requires the IRS and
taxpayers to know the laws of the fifty states to determine whether
arrangements can be qualified tax partnerships.
A definition that relies upon state law can produce different results
for similarly situated taxpayers. For example, a co-owned joint-
production arrangement could be a partnership under the laws of State X,
while an identical co-owned joint-production arrangement could be a
tenancy-in-common in State Y. Other than the state-law classification of
the arrangements, the two arrangements are identical. Nonetheless,
under the current definition of qualified tax partnership, only the
arrangement in State Y would qualify for the section 761 election.
Because the state-law test could treat two similar arrangements
differently, the state-law test is inequitable.216
Furthermore, the state-law test does not further the purpose of
qualified tax partnerships. Recall Congress enacted section 761 to
alleviate the hardships caused by Bentex Oil Corp.217  Madison Gas &
Electric Co. provided that an arrangement that cannot compute taxable
income at the entity level (at least not without considerable difficulty) is
a tax partnership.2t 8 Section 761 allows such arrangements to elect out
value of a gift), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part on other grounds, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002); Powell v.
Comm'r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 161, 164 (1967) (finding the arrangement was a tenancy-in-common
under state law and, therefore, not a tax partnership); Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191
(considering state-law classification to determine whether a Delaware Statutory Trust is a separate
entity).
213. See Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 288 (1946) (rejecting the state law classification, the
Supreme Court stated, "[b]ut Michigan cannot by its decision and laws governing questions over
which it has final say, also decide issues of federal tax law and thus hamper the effective
enforcement of a valid federal tax levied against eamed income").
214. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006) (defining separate entity to be "a
matter of federal tax law and does not depend on whether the organization is recognized as an entity
under local law").
215. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1010-11 (demonstrating that the state-law test is uncertain and
violates equity and neutrality).
216. See id. at 1010-11 (explaining how the state-law test treats relationships differently, even
when the underlying economic arrangement remains the same).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
218. See Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that
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of subchapter K instead of performing the difficult task of computing
taxable income at the entity level. The existence of a state-law entity
should not affect the arrangement's ability to compute income at the
arrangement level. Thus, the state-law test in the regulations frustrates
the purposes of section 761.
2. Eliminate the Alienability Requirement
The alienability requirement in the regulatory definition of
investment qualified tax partnership appears to come from substantive
law. Under substantive law, a characteristic of a tenancy-in-common
arrangement is the co-owner's right to alienate the interest in the
property. 219  Treasury appears to incorporate that characteristic of a
tenancy-in-common into the definition of investment qualified tax
partnership. The right to alienate is derivative of the definition of
partnership, it is not determinative of the definition. 220  The motive for
such inclusion may simply be that Treasury believed that an arrangement
should not be able to elect out of subchapter K unless it possesses the
alienability characteristic of a tenancy-in-common. Policy does not,
however, support that position.
As with the state-law entity requirement, the alienability requirement
undermines the purpose of section 761 and creates administrative
inconvenience and potential inequities. Whether a party can alienate the
underlying property of an arrangement does not affect the arrangement's
ability to compute taxable income at the entity level. If the arrangement
distributes property in kind it will not be able to compute entity-level
income without considerable difficulty, if at all. Determining whether
the members of an arrangement can transfer their respective interests in
"under the Internal Revenue Code the joint venture [was] a partnership and the expenses were non-
deductible, pre-operational start-up costs of the partnership ventures").
219. See FLOYD R. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP § 11, at 15-16 (2d ed.
1920) (showing how co-ownership differs from partnership by providing a contemporary list which
includes: "1. Co-ownership is not necessarily the result of an agreement to create it, while
partnership is. 2. Co-ownership does not necessarily involve community of profit or loss, while
partnership does. 3. One co-owner may, without the consent of the others, assign his interest in such
a way that his assignee will assume his relations to the other co-owners, but one partner cannot do
this. 4. One co-owner is not as such the agent of the others, while a partner is. 5. One co-owner has
no lien on the common property for expenses or outlays, or for what may be due from the others as
their share of a common debt, while a partner has such a lien" (footnotes omitted)).
220. The question of alienability would arise if a coowner attempted to sell the interest
unilaterally. It could also arise if a co-owner's creditor attempted to foreclose on an interest. In
either situation, the alienability of the interest would turn on whether the arrangement was a
partnership or a tenancy-in-common. See William Draper Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A
Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 162-63 (1915) (discussing the significance
of tenancy-in-common classification).
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the underlying property requires a determination of whether the
arrangement is a state-law partnership or a state-law tenancy-in-common.
Because the definition of partnership and tenancy-in-common varies
from state to state and the determination within any state may be
difficult, requiring such a determination creates an administrative
inconvenience. 221 The different possible results in different states also
may create inequity.222 Treasury should therefore eliminate the state-law
classification requirement and the alienability requirement, both of which
are contrary to the Bentex Oil Corp. hardship alleviation purpose.
3. Clarify the Business-Activity Prohibition
Treasury should clearly define the third element of the definition of
investment qualified tax partnership. That requirement currently
prohibits an investment qualified tax partnership from actively
conducting business.223 To have effect, that requirement must narrow the
definition of tax partnership. That means it must apply to arrangements
that are tax partnerships and add an element to the definition of tax
224partnership. With no clear indication of its application, speculation is
the only means of determining its application.
To have effect, the business-activity prohibition must apply to
arrangements that are tax partnerships but have no business activity.
That concept almost seems counterintuitive because courts often refer to
business activity in deciding whether an arrangement is a tax
partnership. 225 Nonetheless, some arrangements that conduct business
activity do not come within the definition.226 In fact, a close examination
of cases and rulings reveals that courts and the IRS are mostly concerned
about the type and source of activity when considering the definition of
tax partnership. 227  Those cases and rulings provide that co-ownership
arrangements may hire a manager to provide customary tenant services
221. See supra text accompanying note 215.
222. See supra text accompanying note 216.
223. Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1995).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
225. See, e.g., Cusick v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 241 (1998) ("The regulations and relevant
case law indicate that the distinction between mere coowners and coowners who are engaged in a
partnership lies in the degree of business activity of the coowners or their agents." (citations
omitted)).
226. See, e.g., Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d 735, 736 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that business
activity did not cause arrangement to be a tax partnership, and the loss from the sale of property was
a section 1231 loss); Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (ruling that a co-ownership was not a tax
partnership, even though the members hired a manager to provide customary tenant services).
227. See Borden, supra note 5, at 992-95 (discussing the type-of-activity test).
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without becoming tax partnerships. 228 That leeway allows arrangements
to provide a significant amount of services-an amount that would
satisfy the trade or business requirement in section 162-without being
tax partnerships. 229 Because the definition of tax partnership excludes
such arrangements, the business-activity prohibition in the definition of
qualified tax partnership must not refer to such arrangements.
Instead, the business-activity prohibition in the definition of qualified
tax partnership must apply to arrangements that provide no business
activity but are nonetheless tax partnerships. That conclusion indicates
that the definition of tax partnership must consider factors other than the
degree of business activity the arrangement provides. A possible
interpretation is that an investment club, or similar arrangement, may be
a tax partnership if the members contribute investment activities to the
arrangement. Under the source-of-activities test, an arrangement should
be a tax partnership if the members contribute services to the
arrangement. 23  An investment club, for example, would be a tax
partnership because its members contribute investment services. It
would not, however, conduct business, so it could come within the
regulatory definition of qualified tax partnership. Tax policy supports a
definition that exempts such arrangements from subchapter K.
Investment activities should not generate income (they merely
support the property's income-producing function). 31 If the definition of
investment qualified tax partnership limits the members' activities to
investment activities, the arrangement's sole source of income would be
the arrangement's property. The members' services would not produce
income. That being the case, the arrangement should be able to allocate
the income and expenses to the members of the arrangement based on
228. See supra note 226.
229. See Borden, supra note 5, at 993-94.
230. See, e.g., Cusick, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 241 (holding that arrangement was a tax partnership
even though members contributed only customary tenant services); Bergford v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d
166, 166 (9th Cir. 1993) (financed, purchased, and leased equipment); Alhouse v. Comm'r, 62
T.C.M. (CCH) 1678, 1679 (1991) (sold, purchased, and leased equipment); Bussing v. Comm'r, 89
T.C. 1050, 1061 (1987) (leased, sold, and encumbered equipment); Bussing v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 449,
451 (1987) (performed maintenance and repair).
231. Business activities, on the other hand, should generate income (the activities increase rental
income, improve the value of property, or contribute to the property's ultimate disposition). See
Borden, supra note 5, at 995. By treating the income from the sale of dealer property as ordinary
income, the tax system treats the gain as derived from the activities of the owners, not from the
investment in the property. See Maijorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation:
What's Law Got To Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 890 (1985) ("The distinction between investor and
businessman is critical here, as it was in Britain, because the former held his capital to produce
income in the form of rents, dividends, or interest; the latter used his capital to buy and sell assets
such that the act of buying and selling produced income in the form of the gains realized from the
increased value.").
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their proportionate ownership in the arrangement's property. Thus, the
arrangement would not be required to compute taxable income at the
partnership level and would not need the partnership tax allocation rules
to allocate the arrangement's tax items to the members. Therefore, such
arrangements should not be subject to subchapter K.
The business-activity prohibition is sensible if it exempts investment
clubs and similar arrangements from subchapter K. Treasury should
modify the definition of investment qualified tax partnership to reflect
this interpretation of the business-activity prohibition. The definition
should clearly provide that it applies to arrangements that are tax
partnerships because the members contribute investment activities to the
arrangement. The arrangement will be a qualified tax partnership,
however, if the member's contributed services are limited to investment
activities, and do not include business activities.232 Treasury could
further clarify the rule by defining investment activities as activities that
do not come within the section 162 definition of business activity.
4. Retain the In-Kind Distribution Requirement
Tax policy supports excluding co-owned joint-production
arrangements from subchapter K if the members individually sell the
arrangement's product. In such arrangements, individual members, not
the arrangement, realize gross income from the sale of the product. Such
arrangements have no taxable income and should not be subject to the
partnership tax rules.233 Nonetheless, the broad definition of tax
23partnership appears to include such arrangements.   The definition of
production qualified tax partnership effectively and appropriately
exempts co-owned joint-production arrangements from subchapter K.
Thus, that provision needs no modification.
232. Thus, the test would apply the source-of-activity test at the tax partnership level and the
type-of-activity test at the qualified tax partnership level. See Borden, supra note 5, at 992-98
(describing the type-of-activity test and the source-of-activity test). This conclusion is different from
any of the possible alternative treatments the Author presented in an earlier article. See Borden,
supra note 32, at 60-61. The conclusion in this Article represents the result of additional thought on
the theory of qualified tax partnerships and appears to enjoy greater theoretical support than the
other alternatives.
233. See Borden, supra note 5, at 1017-23.
234. See, e.g., Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 633 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1980).
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C. Replace the Interdependence Test with a Property-Specific Test
As demonstrated above, the interdependence test works only to the
extent it requires interdependent Code sections to disregard qualified tax
partnerships.235 To the extent the interdependence test may require non-
interdependent Code sections to recognize qualified tax partnerships, the
test often fails. The discussion above demonstrates that property-specific
Code sections may recognize qualified tax partnerships. 236  Other
provisions, such as the gain/loss characterization provisions and pre-
operating costs capitalization rules, should disregard qualified tax
partnerships. 37 Finally, other provisions, such as the definition of self-
employment income, are unaffected by classifying an arrangement as a
qualified tax partnership. 3 8 Thus, only property-specific Code sections
should recognize qualified tax partnerships. The interdependence test
should not uniformly require non-interdependent Code sections to
recognize qualified tax partnerships.
D. Eliminate the Election out of Subchapter K
Tax policy does not support elective tax treatment. Elections
complicate tax planning because taxpayers must hire an advisor to
identify the tax treatment available with and without making the
election. 39  Elections create inequity because taxpayers who are
otherwise similarly situated will be subject to different tax rules if one
makes the election and the other does not. Finally, if tax policy supports
treating some arrangements as qualified tax partnerships, it supports
treating all similar arrangements as qualified tax partnerships. For
example, tax policy supports exempting production qualified tax
partnerships from subchapter K because such arrangements cannot
compute taxable income. 40 Precisely because such arrangements cannot
compute taxable income, they should not be subject to subchapter K. In
fact, policy does not support applying subchapter K to such provisions.
Therefore, the qualified tax partnership elective regime should be
235. See supra Part IV.B.
236. See supra Part IV.B. 1.
237. See supra Part V.B.3-4.
238. See supra Part V.B.2.
239. See Dean, supra note 110, at 430-32.
240. See Borden, supra note 5, at 10 17-23.
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eliminated. Any arrangement that comes within the definition of
qualified tax partnership should be so classified.
VII. CONCLUSION
Qualified tax partnerships are definitely a part of the U.S. tax system.
Under the current arrangement classification structure, they serve an
important function. They exempt from subchapter K arrangements that
policy suggests should not be subject to the partnership tax accounting
and reporting rules. Nonetheless, the importance of qualified tax
partnerships is derived from a faulty definition of tax partnership.
Properly modifying the definition of tax partnership would eliminate the
need for qualified tax partnerships. Absent such a modification,
Treasury should modify the definition of qualified tax partnership to
reflect sound tax policy. Furthermore, the interdependence test used to
determine the applicability of Code sections outside of subchapter K
should only require interdependent Code sections to disregard qualified
tax partnerships; it should not require non-interdependent Code sections
to recognize them.
The tax literature largely ignores qualified tax partnerships. That
neglect is not justified. Qualified tax partnership classification can
significantly affect a taxpayer's tax liability, increasing the federal
government's revenue. Continuing to neglect qualified tax partnerships
could lead to haphazard rules in this area of the law. Haphazard rules
will most likely fail to reflect sound tax policy. Lawmakers should
consider the theory and policy of qualified tax partnerships and preempt
the area by creating sound rules.
[Vol. 56
